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Efficient and Effective? 
The Hundred Year Flood in the Communication and Perception of Flood Risk 
 
Heather Bell 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 In response to the rising costs of floods, the United States has adopted 
sophisticated programs to mitigate the loss of life and property. However, the 
efficient implementation of certain aspects of flood policy has taken 
precedence over effective communication. The scope of the National Flood 
Insurance Program and the efficient coding of “the 100 year flood” have led to 
a pervasive use of the term in both formal and informal risk communication. 
When officials began consciously communicating flood policy to the public, 
they assumed a narrow “engineering” model and did not fully anticipate the 
influence of informal communication on the perception of flood risk. The 
effectiveness of the “100 year flood” as a means to change attitudes or 
motivate behaviors was not assessed. Nor was its utility in increasing public 
understanding of flood risk.  
New explanatory methods have been introduced, but they, too, have 
yet to be tested. This project evaluated the effectiveness of four methods 
commonly used to communicate the risk associated with policy’s benchmark 
flood. These include: a 100 year flood; a flood with a 1 percent chance of 
ix 
occurring in any year; a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in 30 
years; and a flood risk map available through Project Impact.  
Data were collected using a structured face to face questionnaire 
survey of residents living in Wimberley, Texas. Respondents included 
individuals who lived inside the boundaries of official flood plains, as well as 
those who did not. Comparable questions regarding uncertainty, perceived 
need for protection, and levels of concern were asked using each of the four 
methods of description. Qualitative observations were made during both the 
interviews and the collection of secondary data.  
Results showed a significant disjuncture of understanding and 
persuasion with each method; potentially serious problems with the 26 
percent chance method; and a preference for concrete references in 
describing risk. It recommended that use of the 26 percent chance method be 
discontinued. Both the 100 year flood and the map performed better than 
expected; these descriptions are recommended with reservations in lieu of 
more contextually appropriate methods of communication and policy 
formation. 
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Chapter One: Theoretical Context 
 
Introduction 
 
“Effective communication requires the sharing of either abstract codes or 
contexts between sender and receiver” (Boisot, 1995, 93). 
 
 
 
 Information is required in order for individuals and societies to function; 
communication is a means of exchanging information. In order to move 
information from one conceptual or physical space to another, some form of 
contact is required between the parties involved. Contact may take the form of 
a verbal or visual code, a shared context, or both, but does not guarantee the 
successful transmission of an intended message. When neither codes nor 
contexts overlap, communication is both inefficient and ineffective.  
The assumption of shared codes and context throughout social and 
spatial categories can be problematic. Establishing actual shared codes and 
contexts, or learning ways to communicate through the differences is difficult, 
but necessary for meaningful communication. Without this effort, real debate 
and understanding are impossible.  Any exchange becomes a frustrating 
power play where all parties feel ill used as they talk (or yell) past one 
another.  
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 The problems of communication in general are amplified in risk 
communication, where the stakes may be higher. A lack of shared context or 
code can mean that both lives and substantial amounts of money are lost as 
stakeholders run round different problems while assuming everybody is 
addressing the same issue. When these assumptions are enshrined in risk 
policy, mistrust, anger, lawsuits, death, financial loss, panic, or 
overconfidence may result. In the formation and communication of risk policy, 
effectiveness is often traded for efficiency, though communication will be 
neither effective nor efficient if codification is not shared with those the policy 
affects.  
 This problem is especially evident in the official approach to flood risk 
communication. The “100-year flood” has become the cornerstone of 
government flood policy and communication. The words are simple, but what 
they codify is not. They are shorthand for a probability concept familiar to 
scientists, but less familiar to lay folk. Explanations of the term often do not 
clearly address the element of chance or uncertainty, though it is exactly 
these elements of science that the 100-year flood represents. I believe the 
ubiquitous use of the 100-year flood to be a privileging of efficiency over 
effectiveness in both risk policy and risk communication. The prioritization of 
efficiency may encourage misunderstanding and overconfidence and could 
contribute to both death and financial loss. Might there a better way?  
This project examines the public perception of the 100 year flood and 
evaluates the effectiveness of this term and three other methods commonly 
used to describe policy’s benchmark flood. These methods include “a flood 
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with a 1 percent chance of occurring in any year”, “a flood with a 26 percent 
chance of occurring in 30 years”, and a flood risk map. The projec t also 
attempts to identify alternative, and potentially more effective, methods of 
communicating flood risk.   
 In order to make a meaningful assessment, it is necessary to look at 
relevant concepts of communication. These include the ideas of codification 
and context mentioned above, as well as those of efficiency and 
effectiveness. These general concepts must in turn be related to risk 
communication, risk perception, and uncertainty. Then we might be able to 
understand, evaluate, and perhaps alter, the pervasive use of the 100-year 
flood in regulation and communication. 
 
Coding and Context 
 
 We are constantly bombarded by information. Our brains cannot 
handle the infinite individual data coming through our ears, tongue, eyes, 
nose, and skin simultaneously. Our processor is not fast enough. Coding is a 
coping mechanism that prevents information overload by categorizing 
incoming data. It is an organizational method that allows us to pick out 
relevant information, lump it together, and put it into boxes which take up less 
cognitive space and time. Instead of recognizing and processing each 
component of a specific road individually, the combined perception of black, 
yellow, and white, patterned by cracks and the smell of tar is collapsed into a 
single package named “4th Street” and stored away. Coding “economizes on 
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the quantity of data to be processed” (Boisot, 1995, 57). The goal of coding is 
efficiency of both thought and communication. Abstraction performs a similar 
economizing role through the further lumping of conceptual categories. 
 While coding is an individual coping mechanism, social codification is 
also possible. Language is a form of social codification, but it is not the only 
form of codification used to communicate. Body language, facial expressions, 
gestures, color, and form are all used to communicate in social contexts. 
Contexts differ, however, and codification may change with them. A light 
touch on the arm means very different things in different situations.  
 Apparent similarity in social codification (i.e. language) may lead to 
severe misunderstandings if differences in contexts are not recognized. 
Context refers to general physical, political, economic, social, and cultural 
structures, as well as individual and familial situatedness within those 
structures over time and space. What is actually packed into the efficient, 
economizing package of phrase or gesture depends on the contextual history 
of the individuals and groups using it, as well as the situation at hand. One 
who does not share a context with another, or does not recognize a valid 
difference in contexts, does not have immediate access to the same package. 
The content is different, though the wrapping looks the same. Can the word 
“money” possibly mean the same thing to one who’s never had it and one 
who’s never been without? Codification always occurs within a context. We 
can learn the surficial code; it is harder to get at the underlying context.  
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Because codification occurs in context and economizes data, existing 
methods of categorization tend to be reinforced, and new information may be 
overlooked. Creating new categories takes time and energy. Efficient coding  
 “tends to give an existing repertoire of complexions a life of its 
own. With repeated use, it acquires inertia and becomes in 
consequence hard to modify or replace. New stimuli are then 
filtered through an already established perceptual structure 
according to assignment rules set by existing codes. Where 
stimuli herald the emergence of new and complex phenomena, 
calling perhaps for a fresh coding effort, they may not even be 
detected … , let alone responded to” (Boisot, 1995, 47). 
 
In practice, this tendency makes codification potentially dangerous, though 
necessary. It is more efficient to ignore or transform other perspectives than to 
create new categories for conflicting information. Ignorance becomes a coping 
mechanism. It is unintentional; we do not even realize we might be missing 
something. Contexts are validated through codification, as are codification’s 
specific packages. Shared contexts are less likely as time and distance 
increase. Differing contexts become harder to recognize and understand and 
shared social codifications are less likely to have the same content.  
 
Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 
“The first is concerned with economizing on means, the second with achieving 
ends” (Boisot, 1995, 118) 
 
 
 
 “In a communication model, the function of coding is to communicate 
effectively and efficiently” (Boisot, 1995, 42). What does it mean to 
communicate efficiently and effectively? Is it possible to do both? Boisot 
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implies that it may be a difficult balancing act that involves trade-offs in 
modern communicative situations.  
Shannon and Weaver (1949) identify three types of communication 
problems: technical; semantic; and pragmatic. Efficient communication deals, 
in part, with the first problem. How do you get the most transmission bang for 
your communicative buck? Efficient communication requires the quick, 
accurate transmission of a message with as little cost as possible. The idea is 
to pack as much you can into a bundle that does not weigh down the system 
or lose its parts on the way from source to receiver.  
How do you do that? First, just as if you were mailing a package, you 
make it small, light, compact, and durable, easily bounced from place to 
place. You eliminate what data appear to be extraneous, lump the rest 
together, and tie them up with a single word, phrase, or gesture. You code 
them. Second, you make sure your methods of transmission do not rip, tear, 
snip, add to, significantly slow, or divert the package you sent. Increased 
efficiency and higher levels of codification become more important as distance 
and the number of receivers and transmitters increases.  
 Does the fact that your package gets to your intended receiver 
apparently unmolested mean that the communication is effective? No! 
Shannon and Weaver (1949) and Boisot (1995) closely relate 
communication’s effectiveness to its success in influencing behavior in a 
manner desired by the sender. “A meaningful message in some way changes 
an individual’s disposition to act” (Boisot, 1995, 107).  Effective 
communication overcomes Shannon and Weaver’s pragmatic problem. All 
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effective communication is persuasive. The conceptualization of 
communication as purely persuasive is called a “dominance model” (McQuail 
and Windhal, 1981). 
 Efficiency has little to do with the receiver. It does not require either a 
shared code or a shared context. Effectiveness, on the other hand, is 
dependent, to some extent, on both. If the receiver has never seen the 
gesture or heard a word before, no persuasion will be possible. The 
communication will have neither relevance nor use to the receiver. There will 
be no category in which the information fits and it is unlikely that the incoming 
data will be coded by the receiver. The message may very well be ignored 
completely, and will obviously be ineffective. 
 A common code, such as shared language, is the first step in 
overcoming both  semantic and pragmatic problems. The message will at 
least be recognizable and potentially relevant to the receiver. Boisot (1995) 
argues that selecting a suitable code addresses  most of the semantic 
problems of communication. I would argue that a code’s suitability depends in 
large part on context.  
A common code does nothing to guarantee a change in the likelihood 
of behavior. As noted previously, meaning changes with context. A sender 
can control the code used to package information, and to some extent the 
method of transmission. A sender has little to no control (other than the 
selection of an audience) over the coding processes of the receiver. The 
message may take on a life of its own in other contexts. The message might 
surficially mean the same thing, but not have the same contextual meaning. 
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The more highly coded and efficient a message is, the more data it loses and 
lumps, and the more easily a receiver attaches his or her own associations.  
The source of information, particular words, or potential inferences may 
have symbolic meaning to a receiver unrecognized by the sender. Hovland 
(1948) has shown that symbols play key roles in a receiver’s coding process. 
In a shared context, symbols and values are more likely to be similar and 
communication has a better chance of being effective. Behaviors are more 
predictable. Without immediate access to a shared context, effective 
communication takes much more effort. A shared context must instead be 
created physically, mentally, or affectively. 
 There are many  who contest the equation of a communication act’s 
effectiveness with its persuasiveness (F. Johnson, 1991; Ruckelshaus, 1983; 
Belsten, 1996; Trumbo, 2000; Parker, 2000; Kasemir, 2003). This sort of 
theory establishes a paradigm of manipulation, where the goal is invariably 
power over another. It encourages the view of communication as strictly one 
way and regulatory. By equating meaning with persuasion, communication 
possibilities are limited and understanding is undervalued. Persuasion 
continues, however, to be the practical, if not theoretical,  model of much risk 
communication. Flood risk communication, in particular, follows the 
persuasive model. 
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Risk Communication  
 
Components and Interpretations 
“Just as they must understand the strengths and limitations of risk 
assessment, communicators must appreciate the wisdom and folly in public 
attitudes and perceptions” (Slovic, 1986, 184) 
 
 By Boisot’s definition (1995) of effective communication, most risk 
communication has failed miserably. People often simply do not do what risk 
communicators and other authorities want them to. People do not wear their 
seat belts, do not take precautions against natural hazards, do not test for 
radon, and they continue to smoke. All of these behaviors are statistically 
risky and claim numerous lives and millions of dollars every year. Each risk is 
fairly easily mitigated. Quit smoking and wear your seat belt and you will 
(probably) live longer. Many of us do neither of these things, but we worry 
obsessively about nuclear power and plane crashes (Slovic, 1987). 
Statistically these risks claim fewer lives and cost less money. What’s the big 
deal? Why don’t people worry about what they ‘should’? Why don’t we do 
what is ‘good’ for us?!  
Finding the answers to these questions involves untangling the threads 
of risk perception and risk communication. This is a difficult task, as they are 
two intimately related parts of an evolving whole. Their relationship is neither 
linear nor inclusive, but mutually affective. It is not possible to address one 
without also looking at the implications for the other. Let us begin with risk 
communication. 
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Risk communication as a field of study is relatively new. This is not to 
say that no one conveyed risk information prior to the 1980’s, but that 
academic interest in the communication of risk increased at this time. Trumbo 
(2000) identifies two meanings of “risk communication”.  Risk communication 
can refer to a subject of study looking at the situational factors surrounding 
the creation of, the transmission of, and the response to risk information. It 
can also be “an instrument used by parties with vested interests to control 
information” (Trumbo, 2000, 192). The second meaning includes 
communication from those protecting the public’s well being as well as those 
trying to convince us that they are not harming anyone.  This type of risk 
communication is nothing new, and is essentially persuasive. Risk 
communication as a subject of study gained recognition (and funding) in the 
late 70’s and early 80’s. Since then, a more formal theoretical base has been 
established. Communication theory was appropriated by those working in risk 
and vice versa, resulting in a discipline capable of asking unique questions 
and generating practical responses to pressing real world problems.  
From an official’s point of view, the problem was “Why doesn’t the 
public do the right thing, even when we give them the necessary information? 
Why don’t they listen to us? What do they think we are, miracle workers? How 
ignorant!.” From the public’s perspective, it was “Why don’t the officials tell us 
what we want to know? And why don’t they listen to us? What do they think 
we are, idiots? How arrogant!.” Those contributing to risk communication 
research hoped to reduce losses and conflict by bringing these two groups 
closer together. The approaches to doing so changed through time.  
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Powell and Leiss (1997) identify three phases in the development of 
risk communication. [Gilbert White and those working in the Chicago school 
during the mid 20 th century may take offense to the dates assigned to these 
phases, as their work in risk perception made the “second stage” of risk 
communication possible (White, 1945, 1964; Murphy, 1958; Kates and White, 
1961).] The first phase, which they date from approximately 1975-1984, 
focused on comparable risk assessment. Emphasis was put on technical 
expertise and the identification of physical risk categories. It was believed that 
all people should view “managing opportunities and dangers on the basis of 
comparative risk information” as an “inescapable duty” (Powell and Leiss, 
1997, 36).  Communication was authoritarian, privileging scientists and 
officials and denigrating a public who thought and talked about risk differently. 
Neither code nor context was considered and communicators and scientists 
were assumed to be altruistic and objective (Kasperson and Stallen, 1991). 
During the second phase (1985-1994), risk communicators recognized 
they had an audience and borrowed from marketing. Communicators and 
officials began feeling out their audiences and attempted to tailor their 
messages. The key to effective communication became persuasiveness. 
Communication was instrumental and one sided, but made an effort to 
recognize public wants and needs. Altruism continued to be assumed, though 
total objectivity was questioned. Communicators sought to use shared codes 
and began to consider the importance of context. Unfortunately, it has been 
determined that trust in the communicator and message source is imperative 
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for risk communication to be persuasive (Covello et al., 1987; B. Johnson, 
1987; Slovic, 1993). Trust was in short supply. 
The current phase encourages the building of public trust in 
governmental organizations and experts. Communication emphasizes social 
context and attempts to initiate a stakeholder dialogue rather than an official 
monologue. This phase also focuses on demonstrating an official commitment 
to good risk communication practices. This is accomplished through 
consistent trustworthy action in and out of crisis situations. Issues of both 
coding and context have been brought to the fore in this third stage. There 
has been a move towards understanding and consensus in risk assessment 
and communication. Effectiveness has begun to part ways with 
persuasiveness, though the extent to which this is practical or possible is 
debatable.  
Covello et al. (1986) identify four components of the risk 
communication process. These include the message source, message 
design, delivery channel, and target audience. This model closely follows the 
normative model of general communication. Communication can be either 
one-way or two-way; Covello et al. (1987) argue that “effective risk 
communication must be understood as a two-way interactive process that is 
based on mutual respect and trust”(1987, 9). In theory, either side can be the 
message source, but their focus is on the source as the scientist or 
government. Risk communication is primarily seen as transmitting technical or 
scientific information regarding risk from the experts to the public. Their linear 
model is described by Kasperson and Stallen (1991) as “the engineering 
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approach.” The exchange of non-scientific types of risk information is not 
addressed. Their model represents the second phase in the development of 
risk communication. 
Krimsky and Plough (1988) identify five slightly different components of 
risk communication: intention of the communicator; content of the message; 
nature of the audience; source of the message; and direction of the message. 
In addition to these components, they add a latitude factor. Each component 
may be interpreted broadly or narrowly. Covello et al.’s (1987) “engineering” 
model is linear and narrow. Communication assumes intentionality and a goal, 
targets an audience, has an expert point source, and flows along designated 
channels. The broad interpretation takes into account the potential for 
communicative free-for-alls.  
A broad interpretation does not assume a goal and models 
communication as coming from any source through any channel to any 
audience. Non-scientific Information may still influence risk perception. A 
broad interpretation better anticipates the unintended consequences of risk 
information taking multiple paths through multiple sources to recipients 
outside a target audience. Each new source and path changes, and 
potentially removes, the intention of communication. A carefully prepared 
code may initiate different symbol relations and take on different meanings in 
unforeseen contexts. 
 A broad view assumes less control over the result of communication 
and acknowledges multiple sources and types of risk information. It is 
essentially contextual. It expands on the narrow model, but does not render it 
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useless. Much research continues to be conducted using the narrow model. 
Looking beyond the narrow results may give us a more accurate picture of 
risk communication as a whole, however. We may be able to better recognize 
uncertainties, not only in the message, but in its path, interpretation, and the 
response it engenders. 
 
Process and Problems 
 The process of risk communication might become clearer through 
illustration. Physician-patient communication has long been used as a model 
for risk communication (Tonn et al.,1989). Like all risk communication, it 
incorporates elements of uncertainty and probability not often found in general 
communication. I will address each component of the risk communication 
process outlined above. The object is not only to explain the components 
themselves, but to identify the potential failure of communication at each 
stage. I will first examine the narrow model and then move to a broader 
perspective. 
 Tonn et al. (1989) describe the basic risk communication process as 
being comprised of four steps. This is a linear model assuming one source, 
one message,  and an intended receiver or set of receivers. First, “the 
physician develops an internal cognitive judgment of the patient’s state-of-
being” (Tonn et al.,1989, 215) . This is the risk assessment. A physician’s  
judgment is the result of his or her quantitative physical analysis combined  
with a contextual perception of risk. Risk perception will be covered in more 
detail in the following section. The physician is the source of the message as 
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well as its communicator and has a stake in the message and the patient’s 
response in both roles.  
In the second step, the physician “translates the internalized feeling 
into a message that can be communicated to the patient” (215). This is the 
initial coding process. Relevant components include Krimsky and Plough’s 
(1988) intentionality as well as the content of the message. What is the 
physician’s objective? Is it patient understanding or a particular patient 
response? What response? Is efficiency or effectiveness emphasized through 
the coding process? What did the physician choose to include or leave out? It 
may be that the message intentionally does not reflect the physician’s own 
assessment and perception. 
 In the third step, the patient “accepts the message and translates it into 
a form amenable for cognitive processing” (Tonn et al., 1989,  215). This is 
the second coding, where the patient categorizes the incoming data (the 
physician’s message) into his or her own space saving packages. Prior to this 
second coding, the physician decided on a delivery channel and delivery 
direction. This might be a direct  one-on-one spoken exchange, or could take 
written form or that of another medium. Communication might also be directed 
towards a group. It is at this stage that the audience plays an active role in 
communication. 
 Fourth, the patient “internalizes the message into a cognitive form 
consistent with his or her knowledge about uncertainty and medical contexts” 
(Tonn et al., 1989,  215). The cognitive form the message takes, and hence 
its meaning, very much depends on the patient’s experience with uncertainty 
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and his or her condition, as well as the patient’s knowledge, attitude, and 
situation. Meaning depends on perception, which is contextual. Context and 
cognition determine the “nature” of the audience.  
 Whether effectiveness is gauged by the level of understanding or the 
adoption of a specific attitude or behavior, communication must take into 
consideration both coding and context in every step of the process. In this 
narrow, linear example, it is the physician who judges the success or failure of 
the communication. A communication is successful if he or she is satisfied 
with the outcome. A successful risk communication is one in which the 
audience’s perception of risk and uncertainty is functionally similar to that of 
the source. Regulatory risk communication is often judged the same way. 
 Where might things go wrong? First, let’s focus on the source, which in 
this case is also the communicator. Is the physician able to code the 
information and uncertainty he or she wishes to communicate? It may be that 
the physician has no existing boxes in which to categorize data. How does 
one then send the package on? What has his or her own contextuality filtered 
out? What if the incoming data produce conflicting symbols and images within 
the physician? These types of problems make putting together a message 
very difficult and prevent communication from being efficient or accurate.  
 A second problem, one that research has deemed to be of primary 
importance to risk management, is the issue of trust (Covello et al., 1987; B. 
Johnson, 1987; Slovic, 1993). No matter how efficiently coded a message is, 
no matter how much source and audience coding overlap, no matter how 
contextually tailored a message is to an audience, the communication will not 
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be effective if the source is not trusted. Ne ither audience perception nor action 
will come closer to that held or desired by the source. Conflict continues, 
though risk communication is intended to decrease it. Slovic (1993) has 
argued that “trust is more fundamental to conflict resolution than risk 
communication”, although good communication can prevent increased 
conflict. Once broken, trust is very difficult to regain (Slovic, 1993; Covello et 
al., 1987). Trust is particularly problematic in the area of technical risk 
communication and management, but can also come into play in the natural 
hazards arena. The discrepancy can be explained through the research on 
risk perception covered below. The level of trust results from the perception of 
not only the source, but the risk itself.  
 The next set of problems arise when the message channel is added to 
the mix. The more physically and temporally removed an audience is from the 
communication source, the fewer types of codes are available for use (Boisot, 
1995). In a one-on-one situation, gestures, expressions, voice inflection, as 
well as language provide information. In a physician’s pamphlet (or in a flood 
risk map), not only are data very efficiently packaged, only one type of 
package is available. The message channel must be appropriate to the 
message in order for communication to be potentially effective. 
 A third set of problems involves the combination of audience, message, 
and source. It may be the physician has used words unknown to the patient. 
The source is not using a code shared by the target audience. This is, in part, 
a result of different contexts. It is possible that the physician uses familiar 
words to convey information for which the patient has no categories. This 
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makes a second coding difficult. It may be that the physician uses analogies 
that inappropriately substitute familiar concepts for unfamiliar concepts of risk 
and uncertainty. Research has shown the use of analogy in risk 
communication to be problematic (Slovic, 1986). 
Communication may also break down if the words used by the source 
are familiar, but mean different things to the receiver. How probable is 
“possible”? Is a 50 percent chance high risk or low risk? Given the same odds 
of being overrun by locusts, one person may decide to get out of Dodge, while 
another chuckles and goes to fetch the bug spray. Symbols associated with 
the message may also differ, shading its meaning. Hazard imaging has been 
shown to play a role in coding (Slovic, 1986, Benthin et al., 1995) and may 
vary between individuals and groups. The above problems are issues of 
shared context and perception. A source must actively seek to create a 
shared context to increase the chances of effective communication (in 
addition to increasing trust levels), whether effectiveness is judged by 
persuasion or understanding.  
What happens when a broad interpretation of risk communication 
processes is adopted? What might change? How would effectiveness be 
evaluated? Potential problems increase with the number of sources, channels 
and audiences. Messages coded for a specific  context may find themselves in 
unfamiliar terrain after a quick game of telephone. It has been noted that 
messages for a general audience also hit the contextual subgroups 
(Callaghan, 1987).  But it is also the case that messages bound for specific 
subgroups may be intercepted, in whole or in part, by unintended receivers. It 
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is conceivable, even probable in the case of the 100 year flood, that what is 
believed to be a message coded for a general audience is, practically 
speaking, targeted toward a subgroup.  
Not all risk communication is official, and not all communication about 
risk is scientific. Friends and neighbors chat, people watch movies, and many 
of us eavesdrop. Risk information may be passed along all these channels, 
both intentionally and unintentionally. As a message weaves its way through 
different contexts, symbols and meanings change. An efficient package may 
easily be separated from its meaning in an intended context by time, space, 
and perception. In a broad model, contextual contact points and message 
paths might be as important as the “nature” of the intended audience. 
Efficiency might be more of a liability in a broad model if a coded message is 
shown to be easily adapted to a variety of specific symbol sets and meanings. 
These differences may in fact be reinforced through the repeated use of the 
efficient code. Chaos may reign in the guise of order. The subject has yet to 
be studied thoroughly. 
Mileti et al. (1989) have identified a sequential process and problem set 
similar to that of the physician-patient example. The “hear-perceive-respond” 
model is also narrow, but examines communication and response from the 
receiver’s perspective. The coding and contextual components discussed 
above are examined in terms of understanding, belief, and personalization. All 
are directly related to perception. In Mileti et al.’s model, risk communication 
processes can be understood only in light of risk perception.  Lave and Lave’s 
(1991) communication analysis is also focused on the receiver. They sought 
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to improve narrow risk communication by creating perceptual models of risk 
for both experts and laymen and rectifying gaps using appropriate and 
relevant codes. 
 
Risk Perception  
 
Situational and Cognitive Factors  
Tobin and Montz  (1997) identify two categories of components that 
influence perception: situational factors and cognitive factors. Perception in 
turn affects response. If judging a communication’s effectiveness by its 
demonstrated persuasiveness (i.e. behavior), then these factors must be 
taken into account. Together, they constitute the context and potential coding 
of communication. White began the work of recognizing perceptual variables 
and applying them to response (White, 1945). The components of perception 
are interactive, but communication has tended to focus on the situational 
factors as a guide to message construction, presumably because cognitive 
factors are more difficult to assess and group.  
Situational factors include variables of the physical and socio-economic 
environments. Physical components include the magnitude, frequency, and 
duration of individual hazard types. Their technical assessment and 
comparison was the focus of the first stage of risk communication. It has since 
been shown that the physical event is not a good predicto r of response (Tobin 
and Montz, 1997), though experience influences perception negatively and 
positively. Experience tends to bound one’s knowledge of the event, 
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influencing its imaginability, and thus its categorization and assessment 
(Slovic et al., 1974). 
Using  the socio-economic environment to predict perception and 
response has also been shown to be problematic. Individuals and 
communities with similar social relations may react differently to “identical” 
hazards (Clifford, 1956). Socio-economic variables include individual traits, 
such as age, gender, health, and race. Group and community characteristics 
like family ties, social support systems and demographic make-up also 
influence perception, response, and communication. The communication 
channels available and the potential message paths depend on these 
characteristics, and in turn, become part of the context.  Cultural variables like 
language, religion, and behavioral norms may also influence the 
categorization of incoming information by providing an existing coding system 
and symbol set.  
 Situational factors alone do not determine response. The individual 
cannot be ignored, though in cases of extreme marginalization or vulnerability, 
situational factors may significantly bind cognitive ones.  Cognitive factors 
work alongside situational factors to influence perception and behavior, but 
the relationship is not fully understood. Tobin and Montz (1997) include 
psychological and attitudinal variables in the cognitive category. An 
individual’s coding processes and symbologies, locus of control, methods for 
coping with uncertainty (these are covered in greater detail below), and 
general outlook all fit under the heading of “cognitive factors”. None exist 
outside of situational factors, however. Situational factors will determine 
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whether or not risk communication is relevant (Slovic, 1986). Cognitive factors 
will help determine a person’s communicative capabilities and needs, as well 
as control shortcuts to processing information.  
 
Perceptual Trends 
 While it is difficult to generalize about the specific play of situational 
and cognitive factors in perception, some general trends have been identified. 
(Finucane et al., 2000; Daggett, 1987; Slovic et al., 1980, 1979, 1976; Slovic 
et al., 1974). These trends apply to non-scientists in particular, but expert 
judgment may also be fallible. Trends include the use of heuristics, the 
inclusion of qualitative factors in assessment, and an aversion to uncertainty. 
 Heuristics are mental short-cuts. Like coding, they make mental tasks 
like processing information more manageable. Also like coding, they can 
become entrenched and lead to other sorts of difficulties. Two types of 
heuristics pertinent to risk perception have been identified: availability and 
affect. Availability has to do with the ease with which something is recalled. 
Availability was touched on above in terms of imaginability. The more easily a 
hazard is imagined, the more frequent it is assumed to be (Slovic et al., 1976). 
Ease of recall is not always an effective measure of frequency or risk. 
Situational and cognitive factors will influence perception. A recent event, 
though rare, might be more easily recalled than a more common event more 
temporally distant. Imaginability is also affected by more than the physical 
characteristics of the hazard. Risk communication in both the broad and 
narrow senses will have a significant bearing on availability. (Slovic, 1976, 
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1986; Kasperson et al., 1988) Targeted information campaigns or media 
attention may  increase the visibility, and thus the perceived frequency, of 
hazards. Non-targeted, informal risk information will also increase the 
perception of frequency. I’ve never come across an aggressive shark, but I’m 
certainly less likely to go into the water after watching “Jaws”. 
 The affect heuristic describes the knee-jerk like-it-or-don’t-like-it 
reaction to information. Images are also pertinent here, as the “Jaws” example 
illustrates. Epstein (1994) explains that all of us (even the experts) 
“apprehend reality in two fundamentally different ways.” One is based on 
reason, the other is not. The relevance to risk perception is that as perceived 
benefit (“I like it!”) increases, the perceived risk decreases. Similarly, as dread 
increases (“I hate it!”), perceived risk increases. Levels of dread may be 
based on knowledge of potential consequences, the perceived ability to 
control the hazard, and the perceived impact on future generations. In 
general, the more familiar a hazard, the less it is dreaded (Daggett, 1987; 
Slovic , 1987). Most natural hazards are not dread, while nuclear energy, in 
any form, is (Slovic , 1987). These biases solidify over time and are difficult to 
change. They filter subsequent information (Slovic et al., 1979; Slovic et al., 
1974). 
 “Experts” tend to equate risk with fatalities. In addition to dread and the 
level to which the consequences are known, lay people also often include 
catastrophic potential and the effect on future generations (Slovic et al., 
1980). These are rational assessments. Risk communication that dismisses 
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any of these factors will be deemed irrelevant and condescending. It will be 
ineffective. 
 
Uncertainty 
“We have considerable social science and psychological theory and some 
evidence that resource users are unwilling or unable to adopt this probabilistic 
view of the world and are not able to live with uncertainty ” (Burton and Kates, 
1964, 433) 
 
 Perhaps the most problematic trend in risk perception is the public’s 
utter distaste for uncertainty. Science is uncertain. Risk assessment is 
probabilistic. Official risk communication is probabilistic. But people do not like 
probabilities; they like facts (Slovic, 1986).  Tobin and Montz (1997) identify 
three models used for coping with uncertainty.  
The first two are based in the tradition of “cognitive dissonance” first 
examined by Festinger in 1947. They are labeled determinate perception and 
dissonant perception.  In the determinate model, people eliminate the 
randomness of an event. Hazards become both knowable and controllable. 
Randomness can be eliminated in two ways. First, a pattern can be mentally 
projected onto a hazard. “Oh, sure, we get a storm like this every six years.” 
Another way to pattern hazards is through the “Gambler’s Fallacy”, what 
Slovic calls the “law of averages”. “If it happened this year, it can’t happen 
next year.” The second method is the technological fix. “We’ve got a levee – 
no more flooding.” Technological fixes can promote a false sense of security 
that may increase the potential damage should the “fix” fail, a phenomenon 
known as “the levee effect” (Tobin, 1995).  These myths may become 
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ingrained in the local context through informal (broad) risk communication and 
influence the categorization (or dismissal) of subsequent risk information. 
The second model is that of dissonant perception. This is the model of 
denial. Denial may be complete, “We don’t have hurricanes in Texas. They 
only hit Florida”, or partial. Partial denial involves placing the threat in the past 
or giving it only minor importance. An event might be perceived as a freak 
occurrence, the result of conditions unlikely to occur again (Slovic, 1987). 
Minor importance might refer to the perceived magnitude of the event, or to 
perceived personal impact. “What, me worry?” Dissonant perception poses 
the same problems as determinate perception to effective risk communication. 
The third model is probabilistic. This method accepts the randomness 
of events, but renounces all action. It takes the determinate method to the 
other extreme. The hazard becomes completely unknowable and 
uncontrollable; taking responsibility for one’s fate is no longer necessary or 
possible. “It’s in God’s hands.” Instead of eliminating uncertainty, this method 
eliminates the need to wrestle with it. Those utilizing the probabilis tic method 
are unlikely to be capable of coding risk information without significant effort. 
Persuasion assumes some culpability. Communication is unlikely to be 
effective, though not all people adopting probabilistic models forgo action. 
 Kasperson and Stallen (1991) argue that the problem with the 
normative “engineering” model of risk communication is that “it is heavily 
oriented towards the product (the understanding of the message) as opposed 
to an emphasis on the process developing an enduring capability in those 
potentially at risk which can handle uncertainty” (Kasperson and Stallen, 
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1991, 4). Uncertainty is not going away, but little research has been done on 
ways to increase the public’s acceptance of uncertainty, rather than the 
public’s understanding of its “proper” quantification. The bigger challenge is 
perhaps getting the public to understand that those quantifications are 
uncertain and changing as well, made certain only by social “necessity”. 
 The science upon which we base our policies is full of uncertainty. 
Knowledge is always produced in context, and always based on the study of a 
sample. The context may lead to a specific categorization of observation and 
the sample may be very small. When science is used as the basis of 
regulatory policy, its inherent uncertainties do not often show. Once 
extrapolated and canonized, errors and uncertainties compound, but are 
hidden. Schon (1982) and Brian Wynne (1992) argue that “the policy 
language of risk…falsely reduces uncertainties to the more comforting illusion 
of controllable probabilistic processes” (Wynne, 1992, 150).  This patterning of 
risk uncertainty into probability allows risk policy to be made, but uncertainties 
may be further patterned when policy is communicated to the public. 
Policy language is created by politicians, not scientists, and for specific 
purposes. The goal of policy communication is not simply public 
understanding, but public compliance. Policy communication is one-way and 
its effectiveness is measured through persuasion, not understanding. During 
policy formation, communication may be (should be, if trust, shared context, a 
shared code, and effective policy are important) dialogic and oriented towards 
understanding. Once policy is set, communication changes. If a shared code 
and context has not been built prior to the setting of policy, as is the case with 
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flood policy, communicators can only attempt to tailor the message and 
method to the targeted audience. If the audience perception has been 
misjudged or overlooked, effective communication will be impossible. An 
overly efficient message may also make effective communication difficult. 
Wynne argues that, in some sense, 
 “scientific uncertainty can be seen to be important, not in itself, 
supposedly measurable on some objective scale, but as a 
function of (in relation to) the extent of technological or policy 
commitment riding on the body of knowledge concerned. As 
such commitments grow, we can tolerate less uncertainty” 
(Wynne, 1992). 
 
The wider the variety of situations to which uncertain knowledge is applied, 
the greater the uncertainty and error it produces. But the bigger a policy’s 
scope, the more important it is to produce absolute benchmarks. The more 
visible and politically powerful a policy becomes, the more important that it 
appear free of uncertainty. Politicians, like the public, like “facts”. Error and 
uncertainty are enshrined in a language of absolutes or unchanging 
probabilities.  
The bigger a policy’s scope, the further its message must travel. 
Uncertainty makes a message bulky and inefficient. There are too many buts 
and addendums tagging along for an uncertain message to travel very far. In 
order to be efficient, the message needs to drop some baggage.  The more 
certain a message appears, the more efficient it becomes. Thus, as a policy’s 
reach extends, two factors work towards the elimination of uncertainty in risk 
policy communication: a general aversion to uncertainty and the need for 
policy’s efficient transmission. Uncertainty lets go of its qualifications, and in 
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its “certain” efficiency, it is replicated and ingrained through heuristics and 
coding mechanisms. 
 
The 100 Year Flood  
 
Historical Management Parameters  
The use of the 100 year flood as the focal point of current U.S. flood 
policy illustrates the difficult marriage of uncertainty and policy described 
above. It is also a good example of many of the communication challenges 
already discussed. Before examining the problems embedded in 100 year 
flood terminology, it is necessary to look at how it came to occupy its current 
position.  
 In 1875, a congressional report lamented the lack of a unified flood 
control program, stating that “ the experience of one hundred and fifty years 
has utterly failed to create judicious laws or effective organization in the 
several states themselves, and no systematic cooperation has ever been 
attempted between them. The latter is no less important than the former, for 
the river has no respect for State boundaries” (House Doc. No.127, in 
PWRPC, 1950). This was an early call for streamlining flood management. 
Prior federal involvement, like the Swamp Land Acts of 1849 and1850, the 
Flood Control Act of 1917, and the 1927 Rivers and Harbors Act, focused on 
specific projects or prioritized navigation. Most flood control, however, was left 
in the hands of individual communities and states. 
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 In spite of the 1875 plea, federal involvement remained spotty, though 
funding and research increased. It was not until the 1936 Flood Control Act 
that flood control became the official responsibility of the federal government. 
The Act, like others preceding and following it, was passed in order to reduce 
losses caused by flooding. Delegating responsibility for flood control to a 
single body (the Army Corps of Engineers) created both organization and 
cooperation between states, though the cooperation was, perhaps, 
involuntary. Multi-state projects emphasizing flood control as well as 
navigation became more feasible.  
In 1936, flood control meant structural mitigation. Organized federal 
floodplain management ended with dams and levees. Aside from aid, non-
structural mitigation continued to be left to the states. In 1958, only seven 
states had encroachment provisions of any kind (Murphy, 1958). All enacted 
encroachment laws following a major event. The extent to which they limited 
development varied greatly, but none used the hundred year floodplain as a 
guideline. Pennsylvania and Indiana decided encroachment on the basis of 
individual projects. Iowa controlled development in the “floodway”, but 
neglected to define it. New Jersey’s line of encroachment was the flood of 
record, while Massachusetts used the average spring flood. Washington State 
considered encroachment individually, and used the channel banks as a 
guideline. Connecticut was perhaps the strictest, using a level generally five 
times that of the mean annual flood. The multiplicative factor depended on the 
river.  
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Most states did not enforce permit requirements. In his evaluation of 
state encroachment provisions, Murphy states “It appeared that, lacking firm 
criteria of channel encroachment, the states tend to establish requirements 
that are not in major conflict with existing developments nor unduly restrictive 
to new developments” (Murphy, 1958, 20). These considerations took the 
form of “reasonableness” when the National Flood Insurance Act was passed 
in 1968. 
  
The National Flood Insurance Act 
In the 1940’s and 1950’s, Gilbert White (1945, 1954), Francis Murphy 
(1958), the Bureau of the Budget (1952), and others recommended a 
floodplain management program that went beyond structural mitigation. This 
was in no small part due to the approximately 7 billion dollars spent on river 
maintenance and “improvements” from 1936 to 1966 (USWRC, 1971, 1979). 
Research indicated that, in spite of the outlay for flood control, flood losses 
were not decreasing (White’s Interview with Reuss, 1993; Kusler, 1982; 
House Doc. 465, 1966; Holmes, 1961; Renshaw, 1961). In order to stem the 
outward flow of cash, a combination of zoning and encroachment regulations, 
building codes, insurance, and financial incentives and disincentives was 
suggested. 
 Murphy (1958) identified several requirements for successful non-
structural floodplain management.  If regulations were to be enforceable, they 
must be clear and concise, and set with consistent criteria. In other words, 
they must be coded efficiently. Any program must also have sufficient funding. 
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 “To insure consistency in channel encroachment and zoning 
provisions, criteria would have to be established at the federal 
leve l…The zoning criteria would concern flood frequency and 
areas to be subject to regulation, which would both be delineated 
on a zoning map.”(Murphy, 1958, 148). 
 
Though Murphy believed that the state level would be the most appropriate for 
administering flood regulations, he saw that the states had very different 
management philosophies. He feared that the resulting differences in criteria 
would cause inequity. The federal government’s financial resources, existing 
staff, and infrastructure also made it a more suitable choice for establishing 
and recording criteria. Murphy suggested that the criteria should lie between 
the 65 and 100 year floods in order to be effective in reducing losses. 
 Many of the above suggestions were incorporated into the National 
Flood Insurance Act of 1968. As the 1936 Flood Control Act streamlined 
structural mitigation, the1968 Act was designed to create a framework for 
non-structural mitigation. The Act sought to both reduce losses and distribute 
those incurred. The National Flood Insurance Act followed the Southeast 
Disaster Act of 1965, a 1966 report on flood insurance commissioned by 
HUD, and House Document 465, a report entitled A Unified National Program 
for Managing Flood Losses. The report was  produced by a task force headed 
by Gilbert White and presented to the Bureau of the Budget in 1966. The 
National Flood Insurance Act  was based in large part on House Document 
465, though White was not entirely satisfied with the management results 
(Interview with Reuss, 1993). The Act was not a reaction to a specific event, 
but spurred on by multiple events, the culmination of long years of research 
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and argument regarding the feasibility of federal flood insurance and the move 
to non-structural mitigation.   
Tobin and Montz (1997) identi fy four possible community responses to 
hazards and disasters. Communities can modify the event, modify 
vulnerability, modify the loss burden, or do nothing. The National Flood 
Insurance Program established in the 1968 Act had three goals: to better 
indemnify individuals for flood losses through insurance; to reduce flood 
damages through management and regulation; and to reduce federal 
expenditures for disaster assistance and flood control (FEMA). These goals 
emphasize modifying vulnerability and the loss burden while discouraging 
non-action and placing event modification (structural mitigation) within a 
broader management framework.  
 The National Flood Insurance Program is made up of three inter-
related components. These include mapping, management, and insurance. 
Each is designed to function as part of a whole in achieving the Act’s goals by 
encouraging the preferred community responses. Mapping is intended to 
increase awareness and assist in both floodplain management and the 
creation of rate maps. Management includes the use of zoning, codes, and 
permitting in order to decrease vulnerability. Insurance shares the loss burden 
and is intended to reduce the reliance on federal aid. Insurance availability 
and rates are based on mapped risk zones and documented management 
practices. Compliance is encouraged through rate reductions, as well as the 
withholding of insurance, loans, and (in theory) disaster relief.  
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 The focal point of each of these components is the “100 year 
floodplain”. This is the concise, cons istent criteria that Murphy believed was 
necessary for the successful administration of a flood management program. 
While flood maps may include other information, the information most 
important for administering policy is the designation of the Base Flood 
Elevation and the Special Flood Hazard Area. Both of these are based on the 
predicted parameters of a flood with a return period of 100 years.  
Permits are required for all development within the Special Flood 
Hazard Area (SFHA). All new construction must be raised at least 1 foot 
above designated Base Flood Elevation. The National Flood Insurance 
Program prohibits any construction within the 100 year floodway that raises 
the Base Flood Elevation (BFE) 1 foot or more. Insurance is required for all 
building within the SFHA, but is unavailable to communities not identified as 
having SFHA’s or those that do not meet or enforce the management 
requirements above. Levees rated to a 100 year level of protection exempt 
the land behind them from the SFHA.  Both the management and insurance 
components of the National Flood Insurance Program depend on mapping 
the100 year flood parameters. Though they are subject to all the uncertainty 
of surveying and science, these lines are represented as absolute.  
 
The Hundred Year Flood as Benchmark  
How did the 100 year return period become the benchmark of U.S. 
flood policy? There was some precedent in the Tennessee Valley Authority’s 
use of the “intermediate regional flood” as a structural guideline (White’s 
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Interview with Reuss, 1993; Goddard, 1961; Kates and White, 1961), but the 
1% chance flood was not widely used prior to the National Flood Insurance 
Act. The intermediate regional flood is now equated with the 100 year flood. 
When looking at its adoption as the regulatory standard it is necessary to 
consider reasonableness, efficiency, and the individuals involved.  
Murphy emphasized reasonableness in his 1958 report. He was 
speaking of reasonableness regarding specific communities; in 1968 
administrators were looking for a reasonable benchmark for all communities. 
In order to get the program off the ground, administrators “initially had to have 
some figure to use” (White’s Interview with Reuss, 1993). Murphy’s 
“reasonableness” took into account the predicted and historical parameters of 
flooding, along with community use and need (Murphy, 1958). In 1968, 
reasonableness was based on a general cost benefit model. In addition to its 
association with the TVA,  the 1% chance flood was chosen because it 
“constitutes a reasonable compromise between the need for building 
restrictions to minimize potential loss of life and property and the economic 
benefits to be derived from floodplain development” (Krimm, 1998). 
Reasonableness was not assessed on a contextual basis, but a theoretical 
one. What passed as reasonable in policy formation was assumed to be 
reasonable throughout the country. Though suggestions were made by 
researchers like White, the public was not involved in a policy dialogue. Both 
Murphy (1958) and White (Interview with Reuss, 1993) felt that different 
criteria for different situations would be more effective than applying a single 
criterion to communities with different needs, but other forces were at work. 
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The National Flood Insurance Program was broad in scope and its 
functionality depended on producing easily readable maps. There was some 
pressure to get the program off the ground. In a 1985 interview, Gilbert White 
recalls the first FIA administrator as “committed to blanketing the country” 
(Interview with Reuss, 1993, 55). There was no pilot program; George 
Bernstein dove right in, “making large commitments for surveys, for mapping 
programs, and for doing this not using the regular federal agencies, but 
bringing in consulting engineers” (White’s Interview with, in Reuss, 1993, 55). 
In order to map the nation as quickly as possible, using multiple organizations, 
efficiently coded policy requirements were imperative. The resulting maps 
were also to be clear, concise, and consistent, able to travel through time and 
space without obvious alteration. They, too, needed to be efficiently coded.  
The initial goal in adopting the hundred year flood criterion was not 
effective communication of risk or risk policy, but efficient administration and 
implementation. The effectiveness of this criterion in encouraging desired 
behavior, preventing loss, and engendering understanding of risk and policy 
was not tested. It has yet to be tested thoroughly. Efficiency was prioritized; 
effectiveness was not. Because efficiency was prioritized, a single criterion 
was used, chosen because of its perceived “reasonableness”. The efficiency 
with which the FIA set about “blanketing” the country, combined with the 
efficient verbal and visual coding of the 100 year floodplain, may very well 
have led to the institutionalization of the “100 year flood” before its usefulness 
to risk policy and risk communication was proven.   
 
36 
Uncertainty and the Hundred Year Flood 
What is the “hundred year flood”  intended to represent? It is intended 
as a measure of flood risk, though the consequences of such risk are not 
addressed. Flood risk is defined as “the probability that one or more events 
will exceed a given flood magnitude within a specified period of years” 
(USWRC, 1977). For the hundred year flood, this means that an event of a 
specific size or larger can be expected, on average, every hundred years. 
This does not mean it can not happen multiple times in the same year. The 
return period is based on statistical analysis of the historical record, or flood 
frequency curves. Historical data can be augmented by comparisons with 
similar watersheds and precipitation analysis. The basic formula for obtaining 
the return period is  
Tr = n + 1/ m  
 where n equals the number of data entries and m equals the rank of a 
specific flood magnitude. Probability is simply the reciprocal, so a flood with a 
one hundred year return period has a 1% chance of occurring in any given 
year. As with any statistical analysis based on a sample, there is an 
associated error and a set of confidence limits. These “uncertainties can be 
decreased only by obtaining more or better data and by using better statistical 
methods” (USWRC, 1977). They can not be eliminated. 
Statistical error is only one potential source of uncertainty in the 
concept of the 100 year flood. Using an example from the IAWCD, the 
National Research Council (2000) describes probability distribution as a 
reflection of “natural variability” and the error bounds as “knowledge 
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uncertainty”. Climate change can be included in natural variability, but the 
resulting probabilities may be skewed. One must also include mechanical 
error and operator error in creating the frequency curves. In addition, these 
curves, and the probabilities based on them, may change as use patterns 
change in the floodplain and watershed. Maps based on these probabilities 
may quickly become obsolete (USWRC, 1982). Lines could also conceivably 
be manipulated by those in power. 
 In addition to the uncertainties associated with determining probability, 
flood heights, velocities, and consequences of similarly rated events vary from 
place to place, introducing another type of uncertainty. Smith has used this 
type of uncertainty to argue that “it is impossible to set definitions for a 
designated flood that are universally applicable”  (Smith, 2000, 255). His 
argument echoes those set forth by Murphy and White regarding the 
suitability of a single criterion. If a risk benchmark is not associated with both 
temporal and consequential probability, what does it really mean? Is it useful 
for either policy or communication? These concerns have been raised by the 
National Research Council (2000) and by Slovic (1986), but the underlying 
concepts need to be tested. 
As the 100 year flood designation moved out of the arena of 
implementation and into the political and public arenas, it lost its associated 
uncertainty. Scientists assessing 100 year flood parameters probably shared 
a code and underlying context. Embedded in the flood parameters is 
uncertainty resulting from both natural variability and human error. 
Parameters change with changing conditions and may not include all relevant 
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information. At least some of these uncertainties were internalized by those 
conducting the studies. Though “experts” tend to privilege defined uncertainty 
(Wynne, 1992) and be overconfident in their assessments (Slovic et al., 
1979), uncertainty is a part of their context. Other people’s contexts and 
coding systems are not as tolerant of uncertainty.   
An efficiently coded message will be filtered differently by politicians 
and by the general public than by those who originally produced its content. 
The underlying context and symbol set is different. Uncertainty is likely to be 
eliminated as the incoming message is recoded into existing categories. The 
message will be particularly malleable if the code is recognizable and 
potentially relevant, as is the case with the hundred year flood. The 
differences in contextual meaning may not be immediately obvious. Thus, as 
the hundred year flood was quickly institutionalized, its uncertainty morphed 
into certainty, “rapidly transformed in the community mind to a definition of 
flood free and flood prone, with areas above the designated flood perceived to 
be flood free – a misconception often reinforced by flood maps that shade 
only those portions that are subject to the designated flood” (Smith, 2000, 
255). More research is needed to confirm this, but the assertion is plausible. 
General risk communication research supports this conclusion (Hance et al., 
1988). Kates and White (1961) also indicate that map lines, like levees, may 
produce a false sense of security. Efficient communication, perhaps 
inadvertently, has succeeded in making effective communication very difficult.  
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Communication and the Hundred Year Flood 
Since the implementation of the National Flood Insurance Program, 
many (e.g. Wood et al., 1985; NRC, 2000; Smith, 2000; Fordham, 2000) have 
recommended the adoption of public participation in flood risk analysis and 
policy making. The National Flood Insurance Act was passed prior to this 
phase in risk communication. However, public participation in the 
communication of flood risk continues to lag behind that of some technological 
risks and associated policies. This may in part be due to the lack of outrage 
associated with hazards like nuclear power and the consequent differences in 
perception (Sandman, 1987).  
In the beginning, communication of flood policy to the public was a 
secondary concern and took the “decide, announce, defend” route. 
Communication is becoming a primary concern, though it continues to 
assume a narrow, engineering model. Effectiveness is judged on compliance 
with the NFIP, not on the understanding of its principles. Flood risk 
communicators now believe that persuasion is contingent upon understanding 
of the uncertainty concepts originally associated with the hundred year flood 
(NRC, 1995, 2000). However, it is not clear that a better perception of 
uncertainty and probability will bring the risk perception of expert and general 
public closer together or induce a desired response.  
In the narrow model of risk communication, flood risk information is 
assumed to be transferred from experts to a general audience via maps, 
pamphlets, and policy. The message travels through intended channels. 
Because of the efficiency of the message and the shared language of experts 
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and public, a shared code was initially assumed. However, in using the 
hundred year flood as the basis of verbal and visual communication, risk 
communicators substituted a contextual sub-group (the experts) for the public 
as the target audience.  No research on message appropriateness was done 
prior to the implementation of the NFIP. Sub-contexts and symbol sets were 
merged. Potential differences in context were not addressed and by the time 
risk communicators were concerned with context, new meanings were 
entrenched.  
A narrow model does not take into account informal communication. It 
cannot explain the compounding of error as a message makes its way 
through different contexts on unintended routes. It assumes that flood risk 
information is received only through the channels in which it was initially sent. 
The assumption of the narrow model of risk communication was perhaps a 
contributor to the rapid institutionalization of a flawed probability concept. 
Other paths, other sources, and other contexts were not considered. Future 
communication of flood risk would be wise to adopt a broad communication 
model in order to better anticipate perception and behavior, to appropriately 
tailor a message, and to encourage a dialogue of stake holders (Fordham, 
2000). Aspects of the broad model have been encouraged by the National 
Research Council (1995, 2000), but there is more research to be done. The 
“ideal” communication recommended in the 2000 report continues to reflect 
the narrow model outlined by Covello et al (1987).  
Government agencies recognize the inadequacy of “the hundred year 
flood” in communicating flood risk and the danger of reinforcing risk 
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dichotomies (NRC, 1995, 2000;  USACE Guidelines). Over half of flood losses 
occur outside of the Special Flood Hazard Area (Smith, 2000; Faber, 1996) . 
There has been a move to adopt more effective terminology without forsaking 
the efficiency necessary to carry out a nationwide program. The focus has 
been on the verbal, rather than the visual representation of uncertainty 
concepts. The Army Corps of Engineers has altered its Principles and 
Guidelines in an attempt to recapture uncertainty; the objective is to use the 
probability term “1 percent chance flood” instead of using the return period. 
Publications, however, show  that the Guidelines are not always adhered to 
(USACE, 1994). 
 In 2000, the National Research Council suggested several messages 
thought to better convey uncertainty, though the usefulness of the hundred 
year floodplain as a policy benchmark was upheld. Suggested terminology 
included the 1 percent chance flood, percent chance of flooding during a 30 
year mortgage (essentially a 1 in 4, or 26 percent chance), and an analogy 
linking the chance of flooding in 50 years to the chance of tossing a coin and 
coming up with heads (NRC, 2000).  Including damage potential with this 
description of probability is also suggested. Other organizations, like the 
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, suggest a similar shift in terminology (Faber, 
1996). The TVA uses the 26 percent chance in a 30 year period in its 
communication (Newton, 1987). Unfortunately, a glance through publications 
from areas using the 1 percent chance flood  to communicate risk indicates 
that this message may be as ineffective as that of the 100 year flood. After all, 
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there’s “a 99 percent chance of it not happening!” 
(coxsmeadow.homestead.com).  
Arkin (1987) has emphasized the importance of carefully testing 
messages prior to official communication. However, the suggested terms, like 
the 100 year flood before them, have not yet been tested as to their efficacy in 
influencing the public understanding of uncertainty concepts. It may be that 
they reflect the same communicative problems as the 100 year flood. Nor is 
there much evidence that they will produce similar qualitative perceptions of 
risk or levels of concern across contexts, even when uncertainty is accepted. 
The usefulness of an overhaul of verbal coding must also be questioned, 
since the visual coding of flood risk information may not reflect the desired 
changes in communication. 
 
Problem Statement 
 
In the creation of United States flood policy, efficient implementation 
took precedence over effective communication. The efficient coding of “the 
hundred year flood” and the scope of the National Flood Insurance Program 
led to a pervasive use of the term in formal and informal risk communication. 
When officials began consciously communicating flood policy to the public, 
they assumed a narrow “engineering” model and did not fully anticipate  the 
influence of informal communication or contextual differences in meaning. The 
effectiveness of the “hundred year flood” as a means to change attitude or 
motivate behavior was not assessed. Nor was its utility in increasing public 
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understanding of flood risk. Perception of the hundred year flood and the 
term’s efficacy in policy communication has yet to be thoroughly analyzed. 
New terms have been introduced, but the effectiveness of “the 1 percent 
chance flood”, “26 percent chance in 30 years”, and the analogy of the coin 
flip are also unproven. It may be difficult to replace hundred year flood 
terminology in risk communication regardless of the usefulness of the new 
terms. It would, however, make sense to test them before attempting to move 
forward. 
This project will attempt to answer the following questions within the 
context of the case study area: 
1. What is the public perception of the hundred year flood in terms of 
probability and risk? 
2. Is “hundred year flood” terminology effective in communicating flood 
risk? 
3. Is the visual representation of the hundred year flood effective in 
communicating flood risk?  
4. Are the terms introduced as replacements for or augmentations of 
“the hundred year flood” more effective in communicating flood risk? 
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Hypotheses 
 
Comparisons of Effectiveness 
1. It is hypothesized that the hundred year flood will be perceived by the 
public to be regular and predictable and considered a moderate to low 
risk.  
2. It is expected that an event described as having a 1% chance of 
occurring will be perceived more accurately in terms of its random 
nature, but will be considered a low risk.  
3. It is hypothesized that events described as having a 26% chance of 
occurring in a 30 year period will be perceived as a moderate threat 
and more uncertain than a hundred year flood.  
4. It is further hypothesized that current maps are perceived to illustrate 
absolute boundaries, failing to convey uncertainty or effectively 
communicate flood risk.  
 
Situational Relationships to Perception 
5. Individuals with personal experience with flooding are predicted to have 
a better understanding of the uncertainties of the hundred year flood 
and may exhibit a level of concern more consistent with policy.  
6. It is also expected that the perceived risk will increase with age and be 
higher for women than for men.  
7. Accurate perception of uncertainty is expected to increase with 
education 
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Chapter Two: Physical and Social Context 
 
Site Selection 
 
 Several criteria were used in selecting an appropriate case study area. 
These included community size, National Flood Insurance Program status, 
floodplain proportion, and flood experience. Constraints on data collection 
limited potential sites to single small communities; a small population makes 
data collection easier and increases the chances that a sample will be 
representative.  
The second criterion was the community’s status in the National Flood 
Insurance Program. A community that participates in the NFIP has a 
designated Special Flood Hazard Area, a recorded 100 year flood elevation, 
and available maps. In theory, the community will have been exposed to both 
flooding and the terms used to describe flood risk. In this project, participation 
in the Community Rating System (CRS) was not looked upon as desirable for 
the selected site. The vast majority (approximately 20,000) of flood prone 
communities are involved in the NFIP, but only 994 have earned CRS points. 
Communities earn CRS points by exceeding the requirements of the NFIP. 
Examples of activities rewarded by CRS are education programs, relocation 
programs and buyouts, storm water planning, structural measures, and 
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warning systems. A community that does not participate in the CRS is 
perhaps more representative of other most flood plain communities.  
The third criterion was floodplain proportion. If the project was to 
include analysis of perception and behavior both in and out of the floodplain, 
the community could not be completely contained within the SFHA or the 500 
year floodplain. Nor would it make sense to use a community whose residents 
lived and conducted business almost exclusively outside either floodplain. 
Flooding needed to be a legitimate public and personal concern. 
The final criterion was flood experience. For flooding to be a public and 
personal concern, the community selected needed to have recent experience 
with floods large and small, including a 100 year flood. This flood should have 
been discussed in terms of return period in local forums. 
The Village of Wimberley, Texas was chosen as the research site. 
While it serves a portion of the greater Wimberley Valley, the city itself is fairly 
small, consisting of 2,710 people according to the 2003 Census Bureau 
estimate. The community currently participates in the Na tional Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) and has since 2002. The city incorporated in 2000. 
Prior to 2002, the Wimberley area participated in the NFIP through Hays 
County; the county has been a member of the NFIP since 1993.  Neither the 
city nor the county is involved in the Community Rating System, though some 
in the community were curious to learn more about it. Wimberley has several 
neighborhoods both in and out of the floodplain and has experienced a variety 
of flood events over the last 10 years, some of which were quite large. In 
addition, the population of Wimberley is growing, and not all the immigrants 
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are from flood prone communities. This quality will aid in analyzing the effects 
of experience on perception and behavior. 
 
Physical Context 
 
 Wimberley is located 30 miles southwest of Austin and 50 miles 
northeast of San Antonio. It is the largest of several small towns in Hays 
county, including Dripping Springs, Driftwood, Buda, and Kyle. San Marcos, 
home of Texas State University, is the county seat as well as the area’s 
population center. San Marcos is 15 miles southeast of Wimberley. Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 illustrate the location of Hays County and Wimberley, respectively. 
 
Figure 2.1. Hays County Location 
 
 
Source: www.geonames.usgs.gov 
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Figure 2.2. Wimberley Location 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: www.visitwimberley.com  
 
 
Hill Country 
 
 Hays county marks the eastern edge of Texas hill country, a 36,000 
square mile area riddled with canyons extending over portions of 25 counties. 
Hill Country covers parts of two physiographic regions, including the Llano 
Uplift and the Edwards Plateau. The smaller Uplift is primarily igneous and is 
punctuated with rounded granitic hills. It contains some of the oldest rocks in 
Texas. The Edwards Plateau surrounds the Llano Uplift and is chiefly 
limestone (TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Several rivers, including the Frio, 
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Medina, Nueces, Llano, Pedernales, Guadalupe, and the Blanco cut through 
the softer rock of the Hill Country, as do many named and unnamed creeks 
and streams. The Trinity and Edwards aquifers underlie much of the area, 
sending springs bubbling to the surface in New Braunfels, Comal, San 
Marcos, and many other places (TWDB, TSHA, 2002). Plant communities are 
dominated by live oak - juniper parks and woods, with live oak - mesquite 
communities more common in the uplift region. Canyons contain other oak 
species and hardwoods, including black cherry, pecan, hackberry, and Texas 
mountain laurel (TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Bald cypress are common along 
the streams.  
 
Hays County  
 Hays County straddles the Balcones Escarpment, a fault that marks the 
divide between the Edwards Plateau and the Blackland Prairie Region. 
Rangeland is predominant in the northwestern portion of the county, as the 
thin soils and relief make the land inappropriate for most crops. The 
southeastern third of the county is situated on the inland sweep of the coastal 
plains; the dark clay soils are thicker and richer than those of the Plateau 
(TPWD, 2004; TSHA, 2002). Most native vegetation has been cleared for 
cropland. Texas’s natural regions are included in Figure 2.3; Hays county is 
colored blue. 
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Figure 2.3. Natural Regions of Texas 
 
  
         Hays County 
Source: TPWD, 2004 
 
 Water in Hays County runs from northwest to southeast, following the 
elevation change through the Escarpment. The Blanco and San Marcos 
Rivers are the major waterways, but there are others that can, and have, 
caused damage. For the most part, the Blanco flows freely, though Hays 
County contains some small off channel flood control dams located on private 
property and paid for by the federal and county governments. These were 
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credited with reducing losses during the 1998 floods (GBRA, 1999). The 
southern half of Hays County, including Wimberley, lies within the Guadalupe 
Blanco watershed (see Figure 2.4). The Guadalupe Basin includes ten 
counties and drains an area of 1,652 square miles. The Blanco feeds the San 
Marcos River and joins the Guadalupe near Gonzales. This smaller basin 
drains an area of approximately 355 square miles (USGS). The entire 
Guadalupe River Basin has been called ‘Flash Flood Alley’ and is one of the 
three most dangerous regions in the U.S. for flash floods (GBRA, 1999). It is 
of particular importance in areas such as these to effectively communicate 
flood risk and encourage appropriate behavior in both individuals and 
communities. 
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Figure 2.4. Guadalupe River Basin 
 
 
 
 
Source: Gaudalupe-Blanco River Trust  
Numbers refer to gauging stations. 
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The Village of Wimberley 
 The heart of the Village of Wimberley is located at the confluence of 
Cypress Creek and the Blanco River (see Figure 2.5). Wilson Creek enters 
the Blanco west of downtown and numerous washes run through 
neighborhoods. These washes are often not included on flood risk maps, but 
residents indicated that these washes have caused flooding and damage. 
Like that of most of Hill Country, Wimberley’s bedrock is primarily limestone, 
and soils are generally thin. Elevations range from 780 to 1260 feet above sea 
level (TSHA, 2002). Wimberley’s topography and geology puts the population 
at some risk, though open space and vegetative cover are generally 
abundant, allowing for some infiltration.  
 
Figure 2.5. Central Wimberley Topography and Rivers 
  
Source: www.Topozone.com     UTM 14 587076E 3318373N (WGS84/NAD83)
         USGS Wimberley Quad 
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Social Context 
 
A Brief History of Wimberley 
 When Hays County was founded in 1848, Wimberley was a trading 
post known as Glendale. The population was very small and unsettled. In the 
early 1850’s, William Winters discovered the spot and moved his family onto 
200 acres near the confluence of Cypress Creek and the Blanco River. In 
1956, he built a limestone house and a mill. The mill was originally used for 
lumber; a grist mill was added shortly thereafter. The surrounding area came 
to be called Winter’s Mill. When Winters died in 1864, his son-in-law John 
Crude took over mill operations and repaired flood damage to the mill. 
Crude’s Mill was sold to Pleasant Wimberley in 1874 and the name changed 
to Wimberley’s mill. In 1880, the town applied for recognition from the Post 
Office and became Wimberley (Allen, 1986; TSHA, 2002; Wimberley History). 
 Through the course of the community’s early years, the power of 
Cypress Creek was used to produce lumber, grist, flour, sorghum, molasses, 
shingles, and cotton. In 1912, the Creek could no longer power mill 
operations. The mill closed in 1925 and was razed in 1934 (Allen, 1986; 
TSHA, 2002; Wimberley History). It presumably sustained major damage 
during the 1929 flood and may have been unsalvageable. The original site is 
currently occupied by a bank; the town square is just across the creek.  
 Wimberley’s economy changed in the post war boom. With improved 
roads, Wimberley and the rest of hill country became accessible. Austin and 
San Antonio were growing quickly, and many began to look outside the cities 
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for relief and leisure. In the 1950’s and 1960’s, Wimberley began to support a 
growing community of part time residents staying in weekend and summer 
homes. Tourism also increased as vacation lodging was built (Allen, 1986; 
TSHA, 2002). The trend has continued; one third of Wimberley’s businesses 
are directly related to tourism (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002). In the 
past few decades, more of Wimberley’s visitors have decided to stay, 
contributing to a boom in the population.  
 
Demographics 
 In 2000, Wimberley’s population as a Census Designated Place was 
3,797. Its estimated 2000 population as an incorporated city was 2,583. In 
2003, the city population was estimated at 2,710. Wimberley is predominantly 
white (91.2 percent) with the largest minority group being the 6.9 percent who 
identified themselves as Hispanic of any race. English was not the primary 
language of 11.3 percent of the residents. In 2000, 41.2 percent of 
Wimberley’s population held a Bachelor’s degree or higher, while 
approximately 11 percent did not have a high school diploma or the 
equivalent. The median age of the population in 2000 was 45.6 with a median 
household income of $46,042. In general, Wimberley’s population is 
significantly whiter and older, somewhat better educated, and slightly 
wealthier than the rest of Hays County or Texas. Comparisons of Census 
2000 data are included in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1. Demographic Comparison of Wimberley, Hays County, and Texas 
Using 2000 Census Data 
 
 Wimberley CDP Hays County Texas 
Population  3,797 97,589 20,851,820 
% White, Non-Hispanic 91.2%  64.5%  52.4% 
% Hispanic of Any Race 6.9% 29.6%  32.0% 
% English as a Second 
Language 11.3%  23.1%  31.2% 
% with Bachelors or 
Higher 41.2%  31.3%  23.2% 
Median Age 45.6 28.4 32.3 
Median Income $46,042 $45,006 $39,927 
 
 
Growth 
 Current Wimberley residents are concerned about growth, though the 
slogan atop the local paper and website, “A Nice Place to Visit… a Great 
Place to Live”, appears to encourage it. In 2003, Wimberley was rated one of 
the top 10 small towns in the c ountry by Travel Holiday Magazine. Many have 
heeded the call and settled here, including a large number of retirees. Others 
have also come, and ‘locals’ are worried about maintaining the bucolic way of 
life that first brought them to Wimberley. One section of the 2002 Wimberley 
Comprehensive Plan is devoted to growth management. Another section 
deals with community character. So far, Wimberley has managed to keep 
business fairly local, avoid chains, and encourage the arts.  
 Growth has other potential impacts. Increased development puts more 
stress on the water supply. More relevant to this study, development reduces 
infiltration, increases run-off, and potentially puts more people at the mercy of 
larger floods, even when zoning is enforced. And while the Comprehensive 
Plan states that, “Particular attention should be given to preparing for periodic 
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major flooding” (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002), it is not explicitly 
incorporated into other aspects of planning. References are made to 
waterfront development, but flood education is not mentioned. From a pre-
event perspective, this could be problematic, though flood response has been 
actively addressed through the fire department and Wimberley EMS as well 
as CERT (Citizen Emergency Response Team). CERT currently has 20 
members and is actively recruiting. Emergency response organizations hold 
regular flood specific trainings (www.visitwimberley.com/cert). 
 Another potential problem is the lack of collective memory in the 
newcomers. Those with experience may have made mental and physical 
adjustments to frequent flooding unavailable to new residents without targeted 
education. Growth will continue to be a concern as Austin and San Antonio 
spread. Historic Census records are unavailable for Wimberley itself, and 
census tracts have changed significantly. Historical data are available for 
Hays County, however, and illustrate the growth patterns of the region. Figure 
2.6 shows huge growth from 1970 – 2003, with a jump of 61.6 percent from 
1980 to 1990. If the growth rate continues as estimated, the percent change 
will be over 50 percent in 2010. 
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Figure 2.6. Hays County Population Growth, 1950 – 2003 
Hays County Population Growth and Percent Change, 1900 - 2003
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Source: Census Bureau 
 
 
 
Meteorological and Hydrological Context 
 
Weather and Climate 
 Located at 29°59’50” N and 90°80’04” W, Wimberley has rather mild 
winters and hot summers, bordering humid and semi-arid regions. Wimberley 
receives a mean 300 days of sunlight per year, with a growing season of 
approximately 254 days. January is usually the coldest month, averaging 
40°F, while July, with an average temperature of 96°F, is the hottest.  
Mean yearly precipitation is 33.75 inches, with the majority of rain 
falling in late spring and fall. Spring rainfall is usually frontal. The bulk of 
summer and autumnal rainfall is generated through convective thunderstorm 
activity, though frontal precipitation is also common in later months (NWS, 
TSHA, 2002). The area is impacted by hurricane related precipitation as well. 
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These violent rainfall types contribute to the flash flooding for which the 
Guadalupe Basin is known. Average monthly rainfall is shown in Figure 2.7. 
Snow is rare. National Weather Service information is for Austin, which has an 
annual average of 33.42” and a pattern comparable to that of Wimberley.  
 
Figure 2.7. Austin Average Monthly Rainfall 
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Source: National Weather Service 
 
 
 
 
 
The City and Its Surface Water 
 As illustrated in Figure 2.5, Wimberley lies at the confluence of the 
Blanco River and Cypress Creek. The square, which is the tourist and 
business center of the village, is bordered on the north and west by Cypress 
Creek. The Blanco marks its southern edge. Many residences are also 
located near these two waterways, as well as near Wilson Creek and other 
creeks and washes. While the majority of the population does live outside the 
Special Flood Hazard Area, flooding is a very real threat to both personal and 
public property.  
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 Farm Road 12, one of Wimberley’s major thoroughfares, crosses both 
Cypress Creek and the Blanco River. One of the Blanco’s gauge stations is 
located at the RR 12 bridge. Cypress Creek is not gauged. The bridges are 
located just to the north and south of downtown. The firehouse is north of the 
Blanco and west of Cypress Creek, north of both bridges. The firehouse is 
one of the centers of emergency response for the community and is located 
outside both the 100 year and 500 year floodplains. However, if either bridge 
is flooded, responders are cut off from much of their service area. The 
Cypress Creek bridge has been more problematic and a project is currently 
under way to bring it up to flood standards (and relieve congestion).  
 Many neighborhoods also have only one way in and out; during flood 
events, these neighborhoods are stranded. Luckily, flood waters usually 
recede relatively quickly, but this is not always the case. The multiple low 
water crossings are also of concern. An example is shown in Figure 2.7. What 
is ‘safe’ for one vehicle is not safe for another and though these crossings are 
marked ‘closed’ by local officials when the river stage rises above a few feet, 
there is a lag between the time the river reaches a dangerous level and the 
time the crossing is closed. Closings are not always respected. Additionally, 
the existence of these low water crossings may encourage residents to drive 
through flowing water, a dangerous practice in an area prone to flash flooding. 
In Texas, the majority of flood related deaths are caused by driving into 
floodwaters (www.floodsafety.com). 
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Flood History  
 River stages and discharges have been recorded for the Blanco River 
at Wimberley since 1924. There are no gauges for Cypress Creek; flooding is 
reported through local estimates and damages. In recent years, Cypress 
Creek has caused more extensive damage than the Blanco in the Wimberley 
area, and though its flooding is related to that of the Blanco, it is not 
dependent upon it. The creek is only 14 miles long, but it might warrant its 
own monitoring system. 
  Flood stage for the Blanco at Wimberley’s RR 12 bridge is 13 feet. 
According to the USGS, since 1925, the annual peak of the river has 
surpassed flood stage on 24 occasions. The number increases if one includes 
non peak flows in high volume years. Of the 24 floods, 5 were considered to 
be ‘major’ by the National Weather Service, having exceeded 26 feet. 17 feet 
is categorized as moderate. The largest flood of record occurred on May 28 th, 
1929. USGS records the stage at 31.10 feet with a discharge of 113,000 cfs, 
18.10 feet above flood stage. The National Weather Service puts the stage at 
33.30 feet, with the same discharge. Regardless of who’s right, the 1929 flood 
is still used as a point of reference by survey respondents who were in 
Wimberley at the time. Figure 2.8 shows the annual peaks of the Blanco at 
Wimberley from 1925 – 2003, recorded by the USGS.  
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Figure 2.8. Annual Peak Discharge of the Blanco at Wimberley, 1925 – 2003 
 
 USGS and National Weather Service data are not consistent. Table 2.2 
includes the stage and discharge of the top five floods as recorded by the 
National Weather Service.  
 
Table 2.2. National Weather Service Peak Flows for the Blanco at Wimberley 
Rank Date Stage in Feet Discharge in cfs 
1 5-28-1929 33.30 113,000 
2 11-16-2001 28.89 NR 
3 10-17-1998 28.50 116,000 
4 7-5-2002 25.71 66,700 
5 6-9-1997 20.46 34,100 
 
  
 According to NWS Austin/San Antonio, four of the five highest peaks 
have occurred in the last seven years. USGS recorded a similar stage for the 
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2002 flood, but because it occurred in the same water year as the November, 
2001 flood, it was not included in their yearly peaks. However, the USGS 
recorded discharge for the 1998 flood was only 88,500 cfs. Four floods that 
surpassed the 1997 mark were not included in the NWS top ten, let alone the 
top five. USGS has both the 1952 flood and the 1958 flood surpassing 30 feet 
with discharges close to 100,000 cfs. Nevertheless, the four out of five 
statistic is often quoted by lay people.   
 The four floods cited by the NWS were large and damaging (though 
only 2 qualify as major by their standards), but few people aside from the fire 
chief appeared to remember the impacts of the floods in the 1950’s. Collective 
memory appears to have been replaced through informal and accidental 
communication. The void is filling itself. In an area where people’s lives and 
livelihoods are at risk, discrepancies of this magnitude are inexcusable. 
According to Slovic (1993), competing information is a sure was to break the 
public trust. Trust is essential to effective risk communication (Covello et al., 
1987; B. Johnson, 1987). 
 Of the most recent floods in the Wimberley area, the 1998 October 
flood caused the most extensive damage, though its stage and discharge 
were surpassed by the 2001 flood. Most of the damage in the greater 
Wimberley area occurred along Cypress Creek and in Woodcreek, just north 
of Wimberley. The 2001 flood devastated other areas of the Guadalupe Basin, 
but got little to no coverage in the local paper, and several survey participants 
who sustained damage from the Blanco mentioned that it was harder to get 
assistance than in 1998. Local organizations were not as active. Many who 
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did not live on the Blanco did not realize that the 2001 flood had done any 
local damage. The 2002 flood got some local coverage, as it happened 
around the July 4th holiday and produced a 25.71 foot crest, but festivities 
continued and there was little damage reported. The 1997 flood also caused 
significant damage in Woodcreek and along Cypress Creek, but Blanco flows 
were much lower than those of other floods.  
 
The 1998 October Flood  
 Those living along the Blanco tended to use 2001 as a reference point 
during the interviews. However, the 1998 flood appeared to be a life marker 
for the community as whole. The storm was centered in southern Hays 
County, damage was more widespread, and there was less lead time than for 
the other storms mentioned. The reference pattern described above, along 
with individual references to the 1929 and 1958 floods by those who had 
experienced them, supports the work of Lave and Lave (1991), who found 
that people focus on the largest, most destructive flood of their own 
experience, regardless of when it happened. 
 The storm precipitating the 1998 flood came on quickly. Two hurricanes 
in the Gulf of Mexico, an upper level trough, and a cold front combined to 
produce massive amounts of rain in Comal, Hays, and Guadalupe Counties 
on the 17th and 18th of October, 1998. (GBRA, 1999; Slade and Persky, 
1999). USGS estimates Wimberley received over 12 inches of rain in 3 ½ 
hours. Two day totals for Hays County were believed to top 30 inches. Figure 
2.9 illustrates precipitation and gauge locations. 
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Figure 2.9. Rainfall for Oct. 17th and 18th, 1998 
 
Source: USGS 
 
 In the Guadalupe and San Antonio Basins, 13 gauges recorded 
discharges with a return period equal to or greater than 100 years. Records 
were broken at 11 stations. Wimberley’s discharge of 88,500 cfs was 
considered a 100 year flood (Slade and Persky, 1999). The storm’s 
hydrograph is included as Figure 2.10. Note that the line is the daily mean, 
while the “x” is the measured peak. The difference indicates the speed and 
quantity of the storm water. 
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Figure 2.10. Hydrograph for the Blanco at Wimberley 
 
 
 Slade and Patton (2002) reported 32 two lives lost and an estimated 
500 million dollars in property damage. Floodsafety.com, a collaboration of 
federal and regional Texas organizations, reported approximately 1.5 billion 
dollars in total damage. In 1999, the Guadalupe Blanco River Authority 
recorded 12 basin deaths due to the flood and estimated 11,699 destroyed or 
damaged structures. Approximate disaster assistance in the basin totaled 
$117,178,905. In Hays County, 1,040 structures suffered significant damage 
(GBRA) and Floodsafety.com reported one fatality. In San Marcos, the Warm 
Springs Hospital was forced to evacuate as 8 feet of water made its way 
inside.  
The Blanco was not reported to have flooded any houses in Wimberley, 
but the heavy local rains flooded Dry Cypress Creek and Cypress Creek; the 
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Creeks were further backed up by the Blanco. The fire chief estimated that 
Cypress Creek rose to 17 feet, covering the RR 12 bridge. On October 31st, 
the local press reported the possible condemnation of a housing 
development. It is believed that 22 houses were destroyed and 17 suffered 
major damage (Allen, 1998). Another 21 sustained minor damage.  The Red 
Cross estimated that 1.9 million dollars in damage had been done to local 
residences. 22 businesses were reported damaged, though in only two cases 
was the damage over 40%. Twelve people were rescued from Cypress Creek 
(Allen, 1998; Bond, 1998).  
Because other communities had suffered even more serious damage, 
FEMA did not arrive in Wimberley until ten days after the flood. Local 
organizations and large corporations took up the immediate slack, collecting 
donations and providing food, water, and shelter for displaced and needy 
residents. The successful local response reinforces Hughey’s (2003) findings 
regarding the importance of close internal ties in small communities. The 
Wimberley View reported that the Wimberley Intercommunity Network (WIN), 
a group of 15 churches and other organizations formed after the 1997 floods, 
dispersed over $20,000. United Airlines flew in a plane of donations the day 
after the flood and sponsored a fundraiser. WIN also raised another $6,000 
dollars in a December benefit for the flood victims. Many other businesses 
and individuals provided support, though this is not evident in the survey 
results. 
The 1998 flood was officially considered a 100 year flood, though many 
residents have assigned it a return period they think more appropriate, making 
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a mental adjustment towards regularity. Other la rge floods have followed and 
preceded it. Some survey respondents linked the floods to development, but 
dismissed natural irregularity. The physical location of Wimberley and its 
rapidly increasing population necessitate making flood management a priority,  
before and after the inevitable event. Integrated planning and education might 
help, but the information must be appropriate. Hopefully this project will aid in 
the assessment. 
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Chapter Three: Study Design 
 
Introduction 
 
 Any attempt to address a problem statement or test hypotheses must 
start with an appropriate data set. For this project, data were collected using a 
face-to-face structured questionnaire. Interviews lasted from 12 to 30 minutes. 
 Oppenheim (1966) identifies 10 stages of successful social survey 
design. These stages are reflected in the eight components of geographic 
field work proposed by Lounsbury and Aldrich (1979) and the seven steps of 
the survey process described by Rodeghier (1996). When combined, these 
guidelines provide a useful research model. Each of the following aspects of 
survey research and design are required for the completion of a project: 
 
1. A clear statement of the problem; 
2. Formulating the hypotheses; 
3. Determining the research area; 
4. Reviewing the relevant literature; 
5. Selecting the sample; 
6. Designing the questionnaire; 
7. Collecting the data; 
8. Coding and cleaning the data; and 
9. Examining, analyzing, and reporting the data. 
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The first four components were addressed in Chapters One and Two. This 
Chapter will deal with numbers 5 through 9. 
 
Selecting the Sample and Collecting the Data 
 
 A stratified random sample was used in order to most effectively 
replicate the geographic and socio-economic characteristics of the population. 
The target population consisted of all adults over 18 living in Wimberley who 
could complete a questionnaire in English. Subgroups were created 
geographically, delineated between those in either the 100 year or 500 year 
floodplain and those outside an official floodplain. Five neighborhoods were 
chosen as appropriate sampling clusters using the 1998 Flood Insurance Rate 
Map for Hays County unincorporated areas. Two neighborhoods were located 
almost entirely within either the 100 or 500 year floodplain, while three were 
mixed to varying degrees. Two neighborhoods were primarily affected by 
Cypress and Wilson Creeks, the remainder by the Blanco River. Of the 45 
who participated, 26 lived in one of the two designated floodplains. 
 Within the identified neighborhoods, sampling was random. Up to three 
main streets were selected in each neighborhood. On each street, the 
sampling process began with a coin toss to decide on which side of the street 
to start. On the selected side, every other house was approached. If no one 
was home, residents of the next house were contacted. Every third house was 
approached on the opposite side. Interviews were conducted over a two week 
period from the 28th of July to the 10th of August, 2004 from 11 A.M to 6:30 
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P.M. Though several interviews were completed on both weekends, the time 
frame may have contributed to a sample slightly older than the target 
population (see Section Three of Chapter Four).  
 
Designing the Questionnaire  
 
The questionnaire was used to assess the effectiveness of the four 
methods most commonly used to convey flood risk. These include the one 
hundred year flood, the 1 percent chance flood, the 26 percent chance in 30 
year flood, and a flood risk map. Survey data were also used to identify 
alternative methods and explore the relationship of certain situational factors 
to perception and behavior. The questionnaire consisted of three sections 
relating to individual flood history and experience, methods of description, and 
demographic information. The questionnaire is included as Appendix A. 
 
Evaluating Effectiveness  
Effectiveness can be measured through the success of a message in 
bringing behavior and attitude in line with that desired by the communicator. It 
can also be measured by the level of understanding engendered in the 
receiver. This project used both methods to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
descriptive methods listed above.  
Allison Godber (2002) has used public policy guidelines to represent 
the level of risk accepted by local governments. This study used policy 
standards to represent the behavior and level of concern policy makers wish 
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the public to display. U.S. flood policy has deemed that living in the hundred 
year floodplain without insurance or other mitigation strategies is an 
unacceptable risk. Policy views it as an area of high risk and high concern. 
Expressed levels of concern and the perceived need for protection were used 
to measure effectiveness as persuasion. Understanding focused on the 
uncertainty concepts embedded in the four methods of description. 
Effectiveness as understanding was assessed using the public’s perception of 
uncertainty in each of the verbal and visual codes. 
 
Situational Factors  
 The first section of the survey was used to gather information on 
participants’ flood experience. Included were ques tions on both flood 
frequency and damage. This section also addressed past flood behavior and 
information issues. The third section was used to collect socio -economic data 
including education, age, gender, income, and length of residence. These 
data were used to determine whether or not the sample was representative 
and to identify perceptual and behavioral patterns. 
 
Validity and Reliability  
 Face validity and content validity were assessed throughout the 
development of the questionnaire. Pre-tests were administered to 10 people 
to improve clarity, content, and flow. In order to increase reliability and validity, 
the questionnaire consisted primarily of closed questions and made use of 
Likert, nominal, and ordinal scales. To further increase validity, responses to 
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individual questions were combined using factor analysis to form broader 
scales of uncertainty, persuasion, and experience. The internal consistency 
reliability  of  these  scales was evaluated  using  Cronbach’s Alpha. The 
creation and testing of these new scales is addressed more thoroughly in 
Chapter Five. 
 
Coding and Analysis  
 
 Coding was made less subjective through the use of closed questions. 
Data analysis was primarily quantitative, using Simstat for Windows to 
perform standard statistical procedures. Comparisons of effectiveness were 
made using one-tailed paired t-tests at alpha = 0.05. Variables with somewhat 
skewed distributions were tested using Wilcoxon sign rank tests. 
Relationships between situational factors, perception, and behavior were 
evaluated using independent t-tests, likelihood ratios, and Pearson’s product 
moment correlation coefficients. Though the majority of analysis was 
quantitative, the face to face format allowed for qualitative analysis as well, 
adding depth and context to the results. 
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Chapter Four: Descriptive Analysis  
 
Introduction 
 
 As described in the previous Chapter, survey questions were grouped 
into three main sections. Each section included a varying number of 
subsections. The results are grouped accordingly and presented in tabular 
form using numerical and percentage totals. A fourth section consisting of 
thematically related questions is also presented. Means are used where 
appropriate. A total of 45 people participated in the survey; four declined. 
In the first section of the survey, questions dealt with individuals’ 
personal flood histories. Also included were questions on respondents’ 
familiarity with flood programs and information. The second section consisted 
of questions regarding people’s understanding of flood risk and their 
subsequent attitudes toward flooding. Three verbal methods and one visual 
method were used to describe a flood of the same theoretical size. Verbal 
methods included the ‘100 year flood’, ‘a flood with a 1 percent chance of 
occurring in any year’, and ‘a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in 30 
years’. The visual method consisted of a Project Impact flood map readily 
available on the internet (see Appendix B). The questions in the third section 
were used to gather basic demographic information. The fourth section 
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includes the results of questions designed to suggest other useful methods of 
communicating flood risk (see Appendix A).  
 
Section 1: Respondents’ Personal Flood History 
 
Flood Experience 
 Table 4.1 includes the results of questions pertaining to flood 
experience as measured by frequency. Experience in terms of both frequency 
and impact has been shown to be a key factor in perception and response 
(Tobin and Montz, 1997). These questions concerned the number of times a 
person’s home or property, workplace, or community was flooded in his or her 
lifetime, as well as the number of times his or her current home or property 
has flooded. All questions were open ended; groupings are for presentation 
purposes only. Response values of over 50 floods were given for both 
Lifetime Home and Lifetime Community variables. Individual experience was 
clustered around low values; community experience had a somewhat more 
normal distribution. Both the mean and median are given for each variable.  
The variables in Table 4.2 examine experience in terms of impact. 
Participants were given a card listing potential damages and asked to identify 
those they had experienced at any point in their lives. The table shows the 
number of affirmative responses for each damage type mentioned by more 
than 5 percent of the sample. Not surprisingly in an area of frequent flooding 
and few through roads, 64 percent of those interviewed had experienced 
disrupted transportation. One person acknowledged structural damage and 
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another the death of a family member or friend. No affirmative responses 
were recorded for either crop damage or injury. Damages other than those 
listed below were cited by 7 percent of the respondents and included damage 
to docks or peripheral decks. One person witnessed a stranger drown. Of the 
45 people who participated in the survey, 11 claimed they had never 
experienced any damage due to flooding. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Flood Experience 
 
Number of Times flooded 
0 1-5 6-10 Over 11 Total 
 
#. % # % # % # % # % 
Median Mean 
Current 
Home or 
Property 
26 58% 16 36%  2 4% 1 2% 45 100%  0.00 1.82 
Lifetime 
Home or 
Property 
18 40% 23 51%  3 7% 1 2% 45 100%  1.00 4.22 
Lifetime 
Workplace 
38 84% 6 13%  1 2% 0 0% 45 100%  0.00 0.29 
Lifetime 
Community 3 7% 22 49%  12 27% 8 18%  45 100%  4.00 9.96 
 
 
Table 4.2. Flood Damages  
 
Disrupted 
Transport. 
Floor or 
Wall 
Coverings  
Furniture  Keepsakes 
Contaminated 
Water Appliances 
Loss of 
Business No Damage 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
29 64%  14 31% 9 20%  4 9% 3 7% 3 7% 3 7% 11 24%  
 
 
 
Flood Related Behavior 
 
 The next set of variables focused on behavior. Questions addressed 
actions taken to reduce flood damage, reduce vulnerability, and share loss. 
The first question dealt with actions taken to secure personal property or 
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safety during flood events. Participants were given a card listing some 
possible responses and asked to name those they had employed during a 
flood event at any time in their life. The percentage of participants naming 
each response type is listed in Table 4.3. The number who elevated valuables 
reflects the number of respondents who have experienced flooding at their 
current residence (see Table 4.1). Similarly, the percentage who have never 
responded to an event is comparable to the percent whose current property 
has never been flooded. 
 
 
Table 4.3. Personal Event Response 
 
Elevated Valuables Evacuated Personal Sandbagging 
Other  
(Taped Windows) 
No Personal Event 
Response  
# % # % # % # % # % 
16 36% 6 13% 4 9% 1 2% 28 62%  
 
 
 
 In the next question, participants were asked about community 
response activities during a specific event. At the time of the 1998 October 
flood, 64 percent of the survey respondents were living in Wimberley. One 
person identified himself as part of the 1998 emergency response team. 
Another identified himself as currently part of the Citizen Emergency 
Response Team. Again, individuals were given a list and asked to name any 
and all activities in which they participated.  
Of participants citing actions other than those listed on the card, one 
person helped to process flood insurance claims and provide information in a 
professional capacity. Others described neighborhood activities. 
Neighborhood based activities were the most commonly mentioned, though 
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locally organized relief efforts did exist and were publicized in the local paper 
(Allen, 1998). An article in the October 28th 1998 Wimberley View indicated 
that a scheduled clean up was “sparsely attended” (Bond, 1998). It appears 
that community activity was fairly limited to those directly affected, the efforts 
of the Wimberley Intercommunity Network notwithstanding. The majority (69 
percent) of respondents took no community action. Activities mentioned by 
more than one person are included in Table 4.4.  Only one person mentioned 
making a donation; distribution of food and water was not mentioned by any of 
the participants.  
 
Table 4.4. Community Response, 1998 October Floods 
 
Community 
Sandbagging 
Distribution of 
Aid 
Community 
Cleanup 
Neighborhood 
Cleanup 
Helped Friends 
Take Action 
No Community 
Action 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
2 4% 2 4% 3 7% 5 11% 5 11% 31 69% 
 
  
The third question of the behavior set focused on general protective 
measures. Each person was asked whether he or she had raised a house 
above flood level, raised utilities, or taken other protective measures. 
Measures receiving multiple affirmative responses are included in Table 4.5. 
Moving a propane tank, modifying a septic system, and moving higher were 
each mentioned by one person. Most participants had not taken any 
protective measures, though 58 percent lived in either the 100 or 500 year 
floodplain (see Table 4.6).  
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Table 4.5. General Protective Measures  
 
Raised House  Raised Utilities Created Diversions 
Checked 
Previous Levels 
with Neighbors 
Purposely Bought 
or Built outside 
Floodplain/ 
Elevation 
Certificate 
No Protective 
Measures 
Taken 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
4 9% 6 13% 2 4% 2 4% 5 11% 26 58% 
 
 
 
 The final question related to mitigation dealt with flood insurance. 
Participants were asked whether or not they had insurance, or if they did not 
know. Individuals were also asked whether or not they lived in a Special Flood 
Hazard Area (SFHA).  Respondents were again given the Don’t Know option. 
Results are included in Table 4.6.  
 
Table 4.6. Floodplains and Flood In surance  
 
YES NO DON’T  KNOW Total  
# % # % # % #  % 
Insurance 6 40% 4 27% 5 33% 
In SFHA  Believe 
they are 
in SFHA 
8 53% 0 0% 7 47% 
15 100%  
Insurance 5 45% 5 45% 1 9% 
In 500 
Year Believe 
they are 
in SFHA 
1 9% 8 73% 2 18% 
11 100%  
Insurance 3 16% 14 74% 2 11% 
Not in 
Official  
Floodplain 
Believe 
they are 
in SFHA 
0 0% 12 63% 7 37% 
19 100%  
Total Insurance 14 31% 23 51% 8 18% 45 100%  
 
 
 
 
One third of the participants were previously determined to be living in 
an SFHA. Another 24 percent lived in the 500 year floodplain. Of those 26 
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people, only 42 percent claimed to have flood insurance. It is likely that those 
who answered Don’t Know thought it was included in their home policy or 
renter’s insurance. Some who answered Yes may have believed the same; 
FEMA claims that, as of December, 2003, only 9 Wimberley policies were in 
force. These numbers and the behavioral results of Table 4.5 indicate a 
potential failure of flood policy and communication. Those in the floodplain 
appear to be dangerously unprepared for another large flood from the 
standpoint of policy. 
 Respondents were also asked to rate their familiarity with the National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). No explanation of the program was given. 
Familiarity was rated on a four point scale, 1 being very unfamiliar and 4 being 
very familiar. Results were not encouraging and are included in Table 4.7. 
The lack of familiarity with the program may help to explain the apparent lack 
of preparation indicated above. Lave and Lave (1991) cite the poor marketing 
of the NFIP as particularly problematic; communication of program goals and 
benefits needs to be improved. 
 
 
Table 4.7. NFIP Familiarity 
 
Very 
Unfamiliar  
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unfamiliar  
(2) 
Somewhat 
Familiar 
 (3) 
Very Familiar 
(4) Total Mean 
# % # % # % # % # % 
25 56% 11 24% 5 11%  4 9% 45 100% 
1.73 
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Information Sources  
 
 The fourth set of questions in the Personal Flood History concerned 
sources of flood information and respondents’ subsequent satisfaction. 
Participants were given a card listing a number of possible sources of 
information. They were then asked to choose their primary source for 
information on local flooding. They were also asked to name their primary 
source of information on flood response options. Sources that were not 
originally listed, but garnered multiple votes, are included with the rest in table 
4.8. Two people did not name a source in either question, saying they did not 
care about flooding and had not looked for information.  
In both cases, TV was the most widely preferred source for information, 
with Friends and Family second. These findings reinforce the results of a 
study by Anderson (2001) conducted in San Marcos, Texas. It is imperative 
that the television media in the area be well informed. Commercials might also 
be an effective means of communicating options. When the interviews were 
conducted, FEMA had just begun running an informational advertisement 
regarding flood insurance; it was mentioned a few times. 
 
Table 4.8. Information Sources  
 
Info Source TV Radio Paper Friends or Family 
Local 
Gov 
Fed or 
State Gov Internet 
Common 
Sense/ 
Experience 
% 
Affirmative 64% 4% 4% 11%  2% 0% 4% 0% 
On Local 
Flooding 
Number 
Affirmative 29 2 2 5 1 0 2 0 
% 
Affirmative 49% 0% 2% 17%  7% 2% 4% 11%  On 
Response 
Options Number 
Affirmative 22 0 1 8 3 1 2 5 
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The majority of those who cited local government as their primary 
source of information had a relative working in an emergency or planning 
related organization. Others exclaimed, “You’ve got  to be kidding.” It appears 
that many do not directly associate the government with flood information. 
What’s more, they might not trust what information they do get. Disdain 
seems to run deep; in 2002, a referendum was introduced to disband the 
village government (Wimberley Comprehensive Plan, 2002). While it did not 
pass, individuals may find the media more accessible and more trustworthy. 
Anderson’s work found that only 40 percent of those interviewed recognized 
the government as a trustworthy source of information, while 85 percent 
considered television to be trustworthy (Anderson, 2001). If this is the case, 
the government would be wise to work through the media directly. 
 Overall satisfaction with available flood information was rated on a five 
point scale, 1 being very dissatisfied, 3 being neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
and 5 being very satisfied. Over two thirds (71 percent) of respondents were 
either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied with available information. While 
some may not know what they are missing (as evidenced by behavior, 
insurance, and NFIP familiarity scores), the overall score does indicate trust in 
the primary sources mentioned in Table 4.8. These sources should be 
utilized. Totals for each level are given in Table 4.9. 
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Table 4.9. Flood Information Satisfaction 
 
Very 
Dissatisfied 
 (1) 
Somewhat 
Dissatisfied 
(2) 
Neither 
Satisfied nor 
Dissatisfied 
(3) 
Somewhat 
Satisfied  
(4) 
Very 
Satisfied  
(5) 
Total Mean 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
2 4% 1 2% 10 23%  23 51%  9 20%  45 100% 
3.80 
 
 
 
Section 2: Comparative Flood Descriptions 
 
 Section 2 consisted of five subsections and was the main source of the 
data used in analysis. The questions in the first four subsections were very 
similar, if not identical, and were designed to illustrate respondents’ 
perceptions of uncertainty and levels of concern related to flooding. 
Comparable data were collected using the four methods of description 
outlined in the introduction: the 100 year flood; a flood with a 1 percent 
chance of occurring any year; a flood with a 26 percent chance of occurring in 
30 years; and an online flood risk map from Project Impact designed by FEMA 
and the GIS company ESRI. All descriptions refer to a flood of the same 
theoretical size. The results of these subsections were used to evaluate the 
relative effectiveness of each term as a means to communicate flood risk. The 
fifth subsection makes an attempt to identify other potentially effective 
methods of flood communication through the use of both open and closed 
questions. 
 The results of each of the first four subsections are included in Tables 
4.10 - 4.21. The first table in each subsection section concerns questions of 
uncertainty over time and space. The second deals with expressed need for 
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protection of both personal and community interests. The third indicates 
expressed levels of concern pertaining to personal and community loss. In the 
first two sets, participants were asked to respond to statements using a four 
point scale of agreement where 1 equaled Strongly Disagree and 4 equaled 
Strongly Agree. A Don’t Know option was also given. The data on concern 
levels were gathered using a 6 point scale where 1 equaled Very 
Unconcerned and 6 equaled Very Concerned. Don’t Know was not a given 
option. 
 
100 Year Flood Results 
 The first descriptive method used was the 100 year flood. Perception of 
uncertainty was assessed in four ways. Participants were first asked to 
respond to the statement, “A 100 year flood will not happen again in my 
lifetime.” The next statement was, “A 100 year flood could happen one or 
more times in any year.” Respondents were then asked the extent to which 
they agreed that scientists could accurately assess the size of a 100 year 
flood. The last of the uncertainty statements was, “The size of a 100 year 
flood will change over time.” Results are listed in Table 4.10. Unless otherwise 
noted, uncertainty statements used in the following three subsections simply 
substitute the descriptive term. 
Perception of protection warranted by the 100 year flood was evaluated 
on two levels. Respondents were first asked to what extent they agreed that 
they should protect themselves against the 100 year flood. They were also 
asked to respond to the statement, “My community should protect itself 
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against the 100 year flood.” Results are contained in Table 4.11. Identical 
statements of protection agreement were used in each of the following three 
subsections. Only the descriptive terms are different. 
 
Table 4.10. 100 Year Uncertainty 
 
Strongly 
Disagree  
(1) 
Somewhat 
Disagree  
(2) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 (3) 
Strongly 
Agree 
 (4) 
Don’t Know Total 
 
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
One or 
More in 
Year 
3 7% 6 13% 17 38%  17 38%  2 4% 45 100% 
Not in 
Lifetime 23 51% 15 33% 4 9% 1 2% 2 4% 45 100% 
Size 
Accurate 17 38% 11 24% 10 22%  1 2% 6 13% 45 100% 
Size 
Change 0 0% 1 2% 17 38%  17 38%  10 22% 45 100% 
 
 
Table 4.11. 100 Year Protection  
 
Strongly 
Disagree  
(1) 
Somewhat 
Disagree  
(2) 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 (3) 
Strongly 
Agree (4) Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Should 
Protect 
Self 
1 2% 7 16% 17 38%  18 40%  2 4% 45 100% 
Community 
Should 
Protect 
Itself 
1 2% 2 4% 15 33%  27 60%  0 0% 45 99% 
 
 
 
Like warranted protection, concern levels were also related to both 
personal interests and community interests. Participants were asked to rate 
their level of concern regarding personal loss due to a 100 year flood. Next, 
they were asked about their concern regarding community loss due to a 100 
year flood. Results are found in Table 4.12. In the next three subsections, the 
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only differences in the questions regarding concern are the terms used to 
describe the flood.  
 
Table 4.12. 100 Year Concern Levels 
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
(3) 
Slightly 
Concerned 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
(5) 
Very 
Concerned 
(6) 
Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Pers. 
Loss 14 31%  4 9% 6 13% 8 18% 7 16%  6 13% 45 100 
Comm. 
Loss 3 7% 2 4% 2 4% 8 18% 14 31%  16 36% 45 100 
 
  
 
 
1 Percent Chance Results  
 
The second phrase used to describe a flood that policy considers 
hazardous was “a flood with a 1 percent chance of occurring in any year.” No 
reference flood or explanation was given to the participants. In the first 
uncertainty statement read, the timeframe was changed from “lifetime” to 
“next year”. Responses to the uncertainty statements are found in Table 4.13. 
Protection and concern statements remained the same. Results are listed in 
Tables 4.14 and 4.15, respectively. Of particular note is the difference 
between the distributions of personal concern and community concern. The 
mean for personal concern was 2.96; that of community concern was 4.31. 
This appeared to be a consistent trend across the descriptive methods and 
will be analyzed more thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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Table 4.13. 1% Chance Uncertainty 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
One or 
More in 
Year 
2 4% 3 7% 12 27%  26 58% 2 4% 45 100%  
Not Next 
Year 
31 69% 7 16% 3 7% 0 0% 4 9% 45 100%  
Size 
Accurate 18 40% 12 27% 9 20%  0 0% 6 13% 45 100%  
Size 
Change 1 2% 1 2% 16 36%  16 36% 11 24% 45 100%  
 
 
 
Table 4.14. 1% Chance Protection  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Should 
Protect 
Self 
5 11% 7 16%  20 44%  12 27% 1 2% 45 100%  
Community 
Should 
Protect 
Itself 
3 7% 2 4% 14 31%  26 58% 0 0% 45 100%  
 
  
 
Table 4.15. 1% Chance Concern Levels  
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
(3) 
Slightly 
Concerned 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
(5) 
Very 
Concerned 
(6) 
Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Pers. 
Loss 16 36% 3 7% 7 16%  8 18% 8 18%  3 7% 45 100 
Comm. 
Loss 4 9% 2 4% 3 7% 12 27% 15 33%  9 20% 45 100 
 
 
 
26 Percent Chance Results 
 
 The third method used to communicate flood risk was “a flood with a 26 
percent chance of occurring in 30 years.” It should be noted that 64 percent of 
the respondents found this method confusing and asked for clarification. 
When asked, the interviewer described the flood as having an approximately 
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one in four chance of occurring over the course of a standard mortgage. This 
technique has been used by the TVA and NRC as a means of explaining the 
phrase. All other statements were framed in the same manner as those 
concerning the 1 percent chance flood. Results are found in Tables 4.16, 
4.17, and 4.18. As in the previous methods, a rather high percentage (in this 
case, 24 percent) of respondents answered “Don’t Know” to the question 
regarding change over time. This indicates a lack of awareness of the links 
between land use and flooding and may warrant a targeted education 
campaign. Increased understanding might increase public support for non-
structural mitigation. 
 
 
Table 4.16. 26% Chance Uncertainty 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
One or 
More in 
Year 
0 0% 7 16%  17 38%  16 36% 5 11% 45 100 
Not Next 
Year 23 51% 17 38%  3 7% 0 0% 2 4% 45 100 
Size 
Accurate 28 62% 9 20%  4 9% 0 0% 4 9% 45 100 
Size 
Change 1 2% 1 2% 17 38%  15 33%  11 24% 45 100 
 
 
 
Table 4.17. 26% Chance Protection  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Should 
Protect 
Self 
3 7% 5 11%  20 44% 16 36% 1 2% 45 100 
Community 
Should 
Protect 
Itself 
1 2% 2 4% 16 36% 26 58% 0 0% 45 100 
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Table 4.18. 26% Chance Concern Levels 
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
(3) 
Slightly 
Concerned 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
(5) 
Very 
Concerned 
(6) 
Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Pers. 
Loss 13 29%  5 11%  6 13% 7 16% 8 18%  6 13% 45 100 
Comm. 
Loss 3 7% 3 7% 5 11% 4 9% 19 42%  11 24% 45 100 
 
 
 
Map Results  
 
 In the fourth subsection, the communication method was visual. The 
maps illustrated the boundaries of the official 100 year and 500 year 
floodplains, but the shaded areas were not described in those terms. 
Participants were asked only about the depiction of the 100 year floodplain, 
and told that the area was considered by flood policy to be of high risk. The 
first two uncertainty statements were the same as above. Those regarding 
accuracy and change were dropped. Instead, the interviewer indicated a point 
on the map (consistent in each surveyed neighborhood) outside the “high risk” 
area and asked how much they agreed with the statement, “If I live here, I am 
safe from flooding.” This statement addressed map accuracy and the potential 
for unrepresented change. Results for the uncertainty statements are given in 
Table 4.19. Assessment methods for protection and concern levels did not 
change. Results are included in Tables 4.20 and 4.21. 
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Table 4.19. Map Uncertainty 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
One or 
More in 
Year 
0 0% 3 7% 20 44% 17 38% 5 11% 45 100 
Not Next 
Year 31 69% 7 16%  5 11% 0 0% 2 4% 45 100 
Safe 
Outside 
Shading 
14 31% 13 29%  12 27% 4 9% 2 4% 45 100 
  
 
Table 20. Map Protection  
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree Don’t Know Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % 
Should 
Protect 
Self 
6 13%  4 9% 17 38%  16 36% 2 4% 45 100 
Community 
Should 
Protect 
Itself 
2 4% 3 7% 9 20%  30 67% 1 2% 45 100 
 
 
 
Table 21. Map Concern Levels  
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
(3) 
Slightly 
Concerned 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
(5) 
Very 
Concerned 
(6) 
Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Pers. 
Loss 13 29% 4 9% 5 11% 10 22% 5 11%  8 18% 45 100 
Comm. 
Loss 2 4% 3 7% 2 4% 5 11% 15 33%  18 40% 45 100 
 
 
Section 3: Demographics 
 
The questions of Section 3 were used to collect general demographic 
information, including gender, race, education levels, income, and age. 
Participants were also asked for the number of years they had lived at both 
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their current address and in Wimberley. Gender, race, and education levels 
were assessed using nominal scales. Respondents were asked to indicate 
their income using an ordinal scale. Information on age and years of 
residency were gathered using open ended questions.  
Of the 45 participants, 23 (51%) were women. This is slightly lower 
than the 2000 Wimberley CDP Census figure of 54 percent for females over 
18. All but two individuals, or 96% of the sample, indicated their race as 
“white, non-Latino”. The remaining 4% described themselves as “Latino”. 
Census 2000 percentages were 91 percent white and 7 percent Latino. The 
Census Bureau also reported that the median adult age for the population 
was 45.6 years in 2000; the sample median was 52 years. The youngest 
participant was 19 years old and the oldest was 83. On average, respondents 
had lived at their current address for 7.96 years, though the minimum was 
only 0.08 years and the maximum was 30 years. The mean number of years 
spent in Wimberley was 11.95, with a minimum of 0.08 years and a maximum 
of 83 years. Medians for both residency variables were lower than the means 
at 6 years and 9 years, respectively. 
The breakdown of education and income levels are included in Tables 
4.22 and 4.23. Education categories refer to highest degree or level of 
education the individual achieved. One individual declined to answer. The 
income level represents the estimated range of the respondent’s annual 
household income in 2003. Seven people did not want their income level 
recorded.  
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Table 4.22. Education Levels  
 
High 
School 
Diploma 
or GED 
Some 
College 
Associate’s 
Degree 
Bachelor’s 
Degree 
Master’s 
Degree 
Professional 
Degree PhD No Data Total 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
8 18% 10 22% 2 4% 17 38% 6 13% 0 0% 1 2% 1 2% 45 100 
 
 
 
Table 4.23. Income Levels  
 
Under 
$20,000 
$20,001- 
35,000 
$35,001 – 
50,000 
$50,001 – 
75,000 
$75,000 – 
100,000 
Over 
$100,000 No Data Total 
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
5 11% 12 27%  5 11% 5 11% 4 9% 7 16% 7 16%  45 100 
 
 
According to the Census Bureau, 41.2 percent of Wimberley’s 
population held a Bachelor’s degree or higher in 2000. Of those interviewed, 
24, or 53 percent, held the same. When comparing only the percentage of 
those holding Bachelor’s degrees, the sample was approximately 14 points 
higher than the Census data. Percentages were similar in all other listed 
categories. However, none of the respondents had less than a high school 
diploma or the equivalent, while in the overall population, the Census Bureau 
estimated the rate to be close to 11 percent. Median income for the 
Wimberley Designated Census Area was $46,042 in 2000. Median income for 
the sample was between $35,001 and $50,000. This includes the Cens us 
median, though the distributions were not equal. Survey participants were 
slightly better educated and slightly older than Wimberley’s general 
population, but overall, the sample approximates the intended population fairly 
well.  
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Identifying Alternatives  
 
Included in Sections 1 and 2 of the survey were questions intended to 
identify potentially effective (in terms of both understanding and persuasion) 
methods of flood communication. The results from three sets of questions are 
presented here.  
 
Specific Flood Levels  and Relative Concern  
In the first set, descriptions of flood size were given in terms of height 
relative to residence. Participants were read a series of flood heights ranging 
from the yard to over one foot in the home and asked to indicate the level of 
concern associated with each. It should be noted that most residences in 
Wimberley do not have basements. Respondents used the same concern 
scale used in the previous subsections. Results are included in Table 4.24.  
 
 
Table 4.24. Residential Flooding and Concern 
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconcerned 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
(3) 
Slightly 
Concerned 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Concerned 
(5) 
Very 
Concerned 
(6) 
Total  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
Yard 4 9% 2 4% 1 2% 8 18% 14 31%  16 36% 45 100 
Outer 
Walls 2 4% 1 2% 1 2% 3 7% 11 24%  27 60% 45 100 
Up to 6 
Inches 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 4 9% 38 84% 45 100 
6 
Inches 
to 1 
Foot 
1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 42 93% 45 100 
Over 1 
Foot 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 0 0% 1 2% 42 93% 45 100 
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There appear to be two breaking points in the levels of concern 
associated with specific relative heights. The first is the point where water 
contacts the outside walls of the residence. The number of people answering 
Very Concerned jumped 24 percentage points. An identical increase was 
observed when the theoretical flood waters moved inside the residence. 
These points could potentially be used in flood risk communication to make 
the threat more concrete.  
 
Methods of Describing Flood Size  
 In the Personal Flood History section of the questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to identify the size of the 1998 flood using their own words. Their 
answers were then coded by type of description. Seven types of description 
were used by more than one person, including return period, qualitative 
comparison to other floods, flood stage in feet, reference to some point on an 
individual’s property, the estimated number of homes flooded in the 
community, discharge in cubic feet per second, and Don’t Know. These 
categories and the number of people that used each are found in Table 4.25. 
Numerical answers within the categories varied greatly and are 
included where applicable. One person used a community landmark and 
another used rainfall to describe size. One person used two methods to 
describe the flood. Twenty-nine people (64 percent) identified themselves as 
living in Wimberley during the time of the 1998 flood. Those who did not were 
not asked to describe the size of the flood, though three mentioned it. Their 
95 
answers are noted in the table. Most others who did not live in Wimberley 
during the 1998 flood mentioned in passing that they did not know its size. 
 
Table 4.25. Methods of Size Identification 
 
Return 
Period 
Relative to 
Other 
Floods 
Stage Home Reference 
# of Homes 
Lost CFS 
Don’t Know/ 
No Data  
# % # % # % # % # % # % # % 
98 
Residents 7 16%  5 11% 4 9% 3 7% 3 7% 1 2% 5 11% 
1998 Non-
Res 0 0% 2 4% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 1 2% 13 29% 
Descriptive 
Range 
100 to 500 
Year 
2nd to 1s t 
Largest 
25’ to 40’ NA 1 to 50 28,000 to 
300,000 cfs 
NA 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, return period was one of the two most frequently used 
methods to describe the flood. It is the method most commonly used by both 
the media and officials in communication. Seven people also described the 
flood in terms of its size relative to other floods. This may be somewhat 
useful, but depends on a single collective memory that newcomers do not 
have access to, and that may differ among the experienced. Flood stage was 
the third most frequently used method, and may not be currently utilized to its 
full potential.  
 
Aspects of Flooding and Concern  
In the third question presented in this section, participants were asked 
to identify the aspect of flooding of most concern to them. Four choices were 
given, including Level, Frequency, a Combination of Level and Frequency, 
and Other. Of the four people who picked Other, three stated that they were 
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not concerned about anything. One cited speed. The results are included in 
Table 4.26. 
 
 
Table 4.26. Most Concerning Aspect of Flooding 
 
Level Frequency Combination Other Total 
# % # % # % # % # % 
22 49% 0 0% 19 42%  4 9% 45 100% 
 
 
 Approximately half (49 percent) of the people interviewed identified 
flood level as the most concerning aspect of flooding. Another 42 percent 
cited a combination of level and frequency. None chose frequency alone. This 
is a problem. The term most frequently used to describe floods, like the terms 
introduced to replace it, is wholly focused on frequency. Flood risk 
communication cannot hope to be effective if it does not address the concerns 
of those it is intended to reach. The same can be said of flood policy. 
Frequency methods might be effective if linked to specific heights or 
damages, as was suggested by the NRC (2000). Used alone, their 
effectiveness is questionable. A flood stage linked to specific physic al markers 
may be more effective than current methods in communicating flood risk and 
inducing appropriate pre-event attitude and behavior. Agreed upon flood 
levels might also be more useful in creating and enforcing flood policy.  
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Summary 
 
 The data presented in this Chapter provide foundation and direction for 
further analysis. The sample was shown to represent the intended population 
moderately well. Those interviewed had a broad range of experience and 
familiarity with flooding and flood programs. Attitudes toward flooding and 
flood protection also differed, though responses appeared to be more closely 
grouped than expected. The final section showed that individuals describe 
floods in a variety of ways and that current methods of flood risk description 
may not address public concerns. This issue, like the research questions and 
hypotheses outlined in Chapter One, requires more in depth analysis and will 
be examined more thoroughly in the following Chapter.  
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Chapter Five: Analysis and Discussion 
 
Introduction 
  
This project attempted to answer four questions within the context of 
the case study area.  
5. What is the public perception of the hundred year flood in 
terms of probability and risk? 
 
6. Is “hundred year flood” terminology effective in 
communicating flood risk?  
 
7. Is the visual representation of the hundred year flood 
effective in communicating flood risk?  
 
8. Are the terms introduced as replacements for or 
augmentations of “the hundred year flood” more effective in 
communicating flood risk? 
 
The descriptive statistics of the last chapter provided foundation and direction, 
but substantive answers require more in depth analysis.  
In Chapter One, hypotheses were put forth concerning the relative 
effectiveness of four methods used to describe flood risk. Hypotheses 
regarding the relationships of certain situational and cognitive factors to 
aspects of perception were also developed. In addition to assessing the 
validity of the hypotheses, this chapter looks at the relationships between 
situational and cognitive factors and the protective behavior exhibited by 
those living in the floodplain.  
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Several statistical techniques were used to test hypotheses and 
examine the data. Comparisons of effectiveness were made using paired t-
tests for those variables with a relatively normal distribution. Friedman and 
Wilcoxon sign-rank tests were used to compare variables with skewed 
distributions. Relationships between situational and cognitive factors and 
aspects of perception were assessed using Pearson’s correlation coefficient, 
cross tabulation, and independent t-tests. In order to increase the validity of 
the survey results, related variables were combined to form scales; scale 
validity and reliability were tested using factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha. 
Specific analyses are explained as they are used. 
 
Comparing Relative Effectiveness 
 
 As described in previous chapters, the bulk of the survey was made up 
of four subsections containing questions intended to measure effectiveness. 
Each subsection used a different method to describe the same theoretical 
flood event. Verbal methods included the 100 year flood, a flood with a 1 
percent chance of happening in any year, and a flood with a 26  percent 
chance of occurring in 30 years. Floods were described visually through a 
flood risk map available online through FEMA’s Project Impact. Only two 
people mentioned the equality of the 100 year and 1 percent chance events. 
None equated the 26 percent chance event with a flood described by other 
means. 
100 
 Chapter One outlined two methods used to assess the effectiveness of 
communication: understanding and persuasion. In this project, understanding 
focused on uncertainty concepts associated with flood descriptions. Four 
questions in each subsection dealt with environmental or human uncertainty.  
Persuasion was also handled with four questions and was split to reflect 
levels of concern and the perceived need for protection relative to each 
description. These questions were combined to form scales of uncertainty, 
protection, concern, and overall persuasion (a combination of protection and 
concern).  
 
Scale Creation 
  Individual questions provide insight into perception, but the larger 
concepts of uncertainty and risk are more pertinent in the comparison of 
effectiveness. The data regarding the 100 year flood were used to test the 
validity and reliability of the new scales. The 100 year flood is the most 
commonly used method of flood description and respondents answered this 
subset of questions with more confidence, leaving fewer missing values. 
Answers of Don’t Know were treated as missing values in factor analysis and 
reliability testing. Factor analysis confirmed the usefulness of grouping the 
eight questions into the categories of uncertainty, protection, and concern 
described above and detailed in the previous chapter.  
Before testing for reliability using Cronbach’s alpha, the negative 
questions were recoded to reflect a single directional scale. The question 
regarding the ability of scientists to accurately assess  the size of a theoretical 
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flood event was dropped from the final uncertainty scale. In the factor 
analysis, it had the lowest inter-item correlation of all the uncertainty variables 
as well as the lowest loading score. Factor results for the uncertainty scale 
are found in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1. Uncertainty Variable Correlations and Factor Loading for 
Uncertainty Scale 
 
Correlations 
Variables 
Anytime Not Again Accurate 
Uncertainty 
Loading 
Anytime 1.000 .6320 .4067 .8912 
Not Again .6320 1.000 .2740 .7537 
Accurate* .4067 .2740 1.000 .5204 
Will Change .5239 .3008 .08510 .7147 
 
Anytime = Event might happen one or more times in a year 
Not Again = Event will not happen again in lifetime 
Will Change = Size of the event will change over time 
Accurate = Scientists can accurately assess the size of the event 
*Variable not included in final scale 
  
The adjusted scale contained fewer missing values and the alpha score 
increased slightly. In addition, the accuracy question had more to do with 
human error and the uncertainties of science than environmental uncertainty, 
bringing in issues of trust. This question is useful in exploring perception, but 
less useful in assessing an understanding of uncertainty. No variables were 
dropped from the persuasiveness scales.  
Cronbach’s alpha is essentially a correlation measure and ranges from 
0 to 1. Values close to one indicate that the scale produces consistent results 
and that each item has a strong relationship to the others in the scale. 
Rodeghier (1996) and Litwin (2003) set the guidelines for reliability at alpha 
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equals approximately 0.70, though Rodeghier indicates that, “this rule of 
thumb is approximate and should not be routinely applied” (Rodeghier, 1996). 
Because of the limited number of variables in all the scales and the skewness 
of the protection scale, alpha was not expected to be extremely high. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the uncertainty and protection scales were 0.69 and 
0.68, respectively. Each scale can be said to be relatively reliable. 
 
Table 5.2. Cronbach’s Alpha for 100 Year Uncertainty, Protection, 
Persuasion,  and Concern Scales  
 
 Cronbach’s Alpha Valid Cases* 
Uncertainty Scale 0.69 33 
Protection Scale 0.68 43 
Concern Scale 0.46 45 
Persuasion Scale 0.55 43 
 
*Don’t Knows eliminated 
 
Cronbach’s alpha for the concern scale was only 0.46. Condensing the 
response categories did not improve the score. Other descriptive methods 
had higher reliability ratings for the concern scale. The low alpha could be a 
result of both the limited number of variables and the large difference between 
personal concern and concern for the community, which will be discussed in a 
subsequent section. The alpha of the overall persuasion scale was also 
affected by this split. When concern variables for each descriptive method 
were used in an overall scale of concern, Cronbach’s alpha was 0.89. A 
combined persuasion scale resulted in an alpha of 0.91. It is useful to the 
analysis to include and compare the subsets.  
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Creation and Evaluation of Uncertainty and  Persuasion Variables 
 In order to compare the effectiveness of the four methods of 
description, new variables were formed based on the tested scales. The 
values of individual variables were added together to create the new scores. 
The uncertainty scale consisted of three variables with original value ranges 
of 1 through 4. (Refer to the second section of Chapter Four and Tables 4.10, 
4.13, 4.16, and 4.19 for specifics. The accuracy value was dropped and 
values for “Next” were reversed for consistency. New values lay between 3 
and 12. Protection values were also based on a four point scale (see Tables 
4.11, 4.14, 4.17, and 4.20) and new values ranged from 2 to 8. Concern 
variables were based on a six point scale (see Tables 4.12, 4.15, 4.18, 4.21); 
the new range was from 2 through 12. In each case, the higher the score, the 
more effective the communication was judged to be from the standpoint of 
policy.  
U.S. flood policy has been based on an event described as the 100 
year flood. Policy considers this event to be high risk to both individuals and 
communities, but does the public view it as such? New terms have been 
introduced to increase public understanding of uncertainty, but do these terms 
induce the desired level of concern and protection? In this study, methods of 
communication were judged to be effective if the observed mean is at least 85 
percent of the total possible points. This percentage would indicate that, on 
average, individuals answered at least one question of each scale in strong 
agreement with policy and no questions in opposition to policy or with “Don’t 
Know”.  
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As discussed below, there were no significant differences found 
between the various descriptive methods regarding the number of Don’t Know 
answers. Because of this, Don’t Know answers were treated as missing 
values in direct comparisons. However, when judging the overall effectiveness 
of a method in contributing to the understanding of uncertainty or in shaping 
attitudes, Don’t Know is not a neutral answer. It indicates that the coding used 
may not be recognizable. This is especially evident when looking at 
effectiveness in terms of understanding. When evaluating effectiveness as a 
percentage of a scale’s total possible points, Don’t Know answers were 
assigned a value of zero and included in the calculation of the mean. 
Hypotheses concerning effectiveness and expected relative scores are 
outlined in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3. Hypotheses of Effectiveness and Expected Relative Scores 
Expected Relative Scores 
Descriptive Method Hypotheses 
Uncertainty Persuasion 
100 Year Flood 
Perceived to Be Regular 
and Predictable; Moderate 
Risk  
Low Moderate 
1% Chance Flood Perceived to be Random; 
Low Risk 
High Low 
26% Chance Flood 
Perceived to Somewhat 
Regular, but 
Unpredictable; Moderate 
Risk 
Moderate Moderate 
Map 
Boundaries Absolute, but 
Timing Somewhat 
Unpredictable 
Moderate to Low, 
Depending on Location 
Moderate to Low, 
Depending on Location 
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Comparing Perceptions of Uncertainty  
All four uncertainty variables had a fairly normal distribution. Because 
hypotheses had been made regarding the relative effectiveness of each term, 
comparisons were made using one-tailed paired t-tests with an alpha of 0.05. 
Each uncertainty variable was compared to the other three. Table 5.4 includes 
the differences in paired means, the level of significance of that difference, the 
actual mean of each variable when Don’t Knows are treated as zeroes, and 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the mean as a percentage of total points 
possible. Cell values and signs indicate the difference between the means of 
variables in the first column and those in columns two, three, and four. Tables 
should be read horizontally. 
 
Table 5.4. Comparisons of Uncertainty Variables 
 100 Year Comparison 1% Comparison 26% Comparison 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
(Mean as 
Percentage  
of Total Points) 
 Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Mean 
(Don’t 
Knows 
Treated as 
Zeroes)** 
Low High 
100 Year 
Uncertainty NA NA -.53* .040 .03 .45 8.91 67.4%  81.1%  
1% Uncertainty .53 .04 NA NA .52 .00 9.20 69.8%  83.5%  
26% Uncertainty -.03 .45 -.52 .00 NA NA 8.71 66.2%  79.0%  
Map Uncertainty 0.00 .50 -.62 .01 -.22 .23 9.16 70.2%  82.4%  
 
* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column    
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.   
**Total possible points equals 12 
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As hypothesized, the 1 percent method of description has the highest 
overall mean score, but the map comes very close and has the smallest 
standard deviation when including Don’t Knows as zeroes. None of the 95 
percent confidence intervals include values totaling 85 percent of the total 
points possible. However, only the 26 percent method’s confidence interval 
lies entirely below 80 percent of the total points; it is also the only method 
whose median is 9 rather than 10. 
 While none are categorically effective, no method can be dismissed as 
completely ineffective in conveying uncertainty. The higher than expected 
mean value given the 100 year flood may have quite a bit to do with its 
familiarity in a developing, flood prone area. Mental adjustments may have 
been made by turning ‘100 year’ events into regular episodes of a different 
period. Experience may similarly impact the map score, as many individuals 
had a concrete idea of past flood parameters and neighborhood topography. 
The influence of experience and other situational factors on perception will be 
examined in subsequent sections. 
 In direct comparisons using paired t-tests, uncertainty scores 
associated with the 1 percent flood were significantly higher than those of all 
three of the other descriptive methods. Though the map was suspected to 
have the lowest comparative uncertainty score, no significant differences were 
found between the map, the 100 year, or the 26 percent methods.  
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Comparing Perceptions of Accuracy  
The 26% results should be treated carefully. The accuracy question 
was removed from the uncertainty scale, but best illustrates a qualitative trend 
observed during the interviews. Participants were uncomfortable with the 
apparent exactness of both the percentage and the timeframe in the 26% 
chance in 30 years description. When asked whether they agreed that 
scientists could accurately assess the size of a flood described in this manner, 
more than one participant exclaimed, after a derisive snicker, “Who do they 
think they are, God?”. Reactions were immediate and often forceful and 
appeared to be directly related to the terms used. None of the other methods 
of description elicited such a strong response. Quantitative analysis confirmed 
the trend.  
  
Table 5.5. Comparisons of Perceived Accuracy 
 
100 Year 
Comparison 1% Comparison 26% Comparison 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
( Mean as 
Percentage 
 of Total Points) 
 Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Individual 
Mean** 
Low High 
100 Year 
Accuracy NA NA .08 .13 .47 .00 1.87 39.6%  54.0%  
1% Accuracy -.08 .13 NA NA .38 .00 1.77 37.7%  50.8%  
26% Accuracy -.47* .00 -.39 .00 NA NA 1.42 30.1%  40.7%  
Map Accuracy .27 .08 .29 .07 .70 .00 2.14 45.9%  61.1%  
 
* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column    
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.   
**Total possible points equals 4 
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Comparisons were again made through a one-tailed t-test at alpha = 
0.05. Neither the variable nor the scale were modified from the original, so the 
scale ranges from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. No significant 
differences were found between the other methods, though the map had the 
highest overall score and its highest p -value was 0.08. The difference in mean  
score  was up to 5 times as great as the differences between other scores. 
Differences were all significant at  0.00.  The extreme shift in attitude is 
illustrated in Figures 5.1 and 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.1. Histogram of Map Accuracy Ratings 
 
1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Strongly Agree 
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Figure 5.2. Histogram of 26% Chance Accuracy Ratings  
 
1=Strongly Disagree, 4=Strongly Agree 
 
While a healthy skepticism of science and probability is useful and 
indicates a better understanding of uncertainty, its total dismissal is 
detrimental to both persuasion and understanding. The agreement scores are 
all low, but the strength of the disagreement associated with 26% terminology 
and accuracy makes other data gathered using the term suspect. This 
judgment is reinforced by the confusion score (64 percent asked for 
clarification) discussed in the last chapter.  
During the interviews, it also appeared that the probability terms (1  
percent and 26 percent chance) were garnering more answers of “Don’t 
Know” than the map or the 100 year flood description. This was most 
apparent in the uncertainty section of the survey. Don’t Know content was 
also statistically tested; a method with a comparatively high number of Don’t 
Knows could be considered somewhat ineffective, regardless of other test 
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results. It may indicate a potential coding problem in addition to a 
comprehension problem. 
New  variables were created by converting all Don’t Know values to 1 
and all others to 0. Don’t Know values for each descriptive method were 
combined, then compared. The map had the fewest Don’t Know responses 
and the lowest score, which in this case is a positive thing. When compared to 
both the 1 percent method and the 26 percent method, the resulting p-value 
was 0.055. No other differences were significant at alpha equals 0.05 or 0.10. 
While this could be considered a boost for the case of the map, there was 
more of a relationship between individual questions and answers of Don’t 
Know. Out of 65 total Don’t Knows, 50 occurred in the questions about 
accuracy and change. These concepts of uncertainty, particularly that of 
change over time, should perhaps be targeted through education. 
 
Comparing Attitudes Toward Protection 
The protection variables as a whole did not clearly demonstrate either a 
normal or skewed distribution; all were generally concentrated around high 
values, but differed in the patterns of their lower values. Because of the 
ambiguity of the variables’ distributions as a whole, both non parametric tests 
and t-tests were used to detect tends. Possible values ranged from 2 to 8, 
with higher values more desirable from the perspective of policy. 
Initially, a Friedman test was used. Differences were not found to be 
significant at alpha equals 0.05, though the p-value was 0.071. Wilcoxon tests 
found significant differences in protection scores between the 1 percent 
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method and the 100 year flood (1 percent lower, p = 0.02) and 1 percent and 
26 percent (1 percent lower, p = 0.02).  The 1 percent score was lower than 
the map score at a significance of 0.07. No other differences were significant. 
The results of the non parametric tests were reinforced through the results of 
the paired t-tests, included in Table 5.6. Means and confidence intervals are 
also listed.  
 
Table 5.6. Comparison of Protection Variables 
 
100 Year 
Comparison 1% Comparison 26% Comparison 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
( Mean as 
Percentage 
 of Total Points) 
 Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Individual 
Mean 
(Don’t 
Knows 
Treated as 
Zeroes)** 
Low High 
100 Year 
Protection NA NA .49 .01 .12 .26 6.58 76.6%  87.9%  
1% Protection -.49* .01 NA NA -.34 .02 6.22 71.7%  83.9%  
26% Protection -.12 .26 .34 .02 NA NA 6.53 76.4%  87.0%  
Map Protection -.26 .13 .28 .11 .07 .37 6.31 71.6%  86.2%  
 
* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column    
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.   
**Total possible points equals 8 
 
The combination of results may help confirm that the 1 percent 
description is less effective than the other terms in inducing protective 
behavior or appropriate levels of concern, as was hypothesized. This method 
was the only one whose confidence interval did not include the 85 percent 
mark. It was close, however, and both the median and the mode were 7. The 
mode for the 26 percent method was only 6. Though the 1 percent method 
appears relatively less effective, the results are inconclusive. The expressed 
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desire to protect oneself and community against flooding may not be related 
to the terms used to describe risk. 
 
Comparing Concern 
Concern variables showed a normal distribution, so the one-tailed 
paired t-test was used with an alpha of 0.05. Results are included in Table 
5.7. Cell signs and values again refer to the variables in the first column.  
 
Table 5.7. Comparisons of Concern Variables 
 100 Year Comparison 1% Comparison 26% Comparison 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
( Mean as 
Percentage 
 of Total Points) 
 Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Individual 
Mean 
(No Don’t 
Knows 
Recorded)** 
Low High 
100 Year 
Concern NA NA .60 .03 .18 .23 7.87 58.9%  72.2%  
1% Concern -.60* .03 NA NA -.42 .06 7.27 54.2%  67.0%  
26% Concern  -.18 .23 .42 .06 NA NA 7.69 57.0%  71.1%  
Map Concern  .27 .16 .87 .00 .44 .02 8.13 60.8%  74.7%  
 
* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column    
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.   
**Total possible points equals 12 
 
 Though the map was significantly more effective than either of the 
probabilities, it was not shown to be better than the 100 year flood in raising  
concern. This may again be attributable to public familiarity with 100 year 
flood terminology and the aforementioned confusion caused by probabilities. 
Maps may serve as an effective jolt to those on the fringes  of the Special 
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Flood Hazard Area who have not sought out a lot of information and have not 
been required to get insurance. Several respondents (especially those near 
the 100 year flood plain) remarked that they did not realize they were so close 
to danger. None of the percentage ranges are encouraging, however, and the 
1 percent description is shown to be the least effective in motivating attitude. 
Its paired mean concern score was significantly lower than those of both the 
map and the 100 year flood and only slightly above significant in relation to 
the 26 percent description.  
 
Comparing Persuasion 
 As an overall measure of persuasion, a scale including the two 
protection variables (personal and community) and the two measures of 
concern (also personal and community) was found to have a Cronbach’s 
alpha of greater than .67 for three out of the four methods of description. The 
highest was 0.73, the lowest 0.55, with an average of 0.66. Based on these 
numbers, the scale was judged to be fairly reliable and was used to compare 
the overall effectiveness of each method, as judged by persuasion.  
 The original protection variables were based on a four point scale; 
concern variables ranged from one to six. In order to give protection and 
concern equal weighting in the new scale, protection scores were multiplied 
by 1.5 before combination. Overall persuasion scores ranged from 6 to 24. 
Distribution was normal and comparisons were made using one-tailed paired 
t-tests at alpha = 0.05. Results are included in Table 5.8 . 
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Table 5.8. Comparisons of Overall Persuasion Scores  
 
100 Year 
Comparison 1% Comparison 26% Comparison 
95% Confidence 
Interval  
( Mean as 
Percentage 
 of Total Points) 
 Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Individual 
Mean 
(Don’t Know 
Treated as 
Zeroes)** 
Low High 
100 Year 
Persuasion NA NA 1.36 .01 .24 .27 17.73 69.1%  78.6%  
1% Persuasion -1.36* .01 NA NA -.99 .01 16.60 63.7%  74.6%  
26% Persuasion -.24 .27 .99 .01 NA NA 17.49 67.5%  78.3%  
Map Persuasion -.15 .37 1.37 .01 .27 .26 17.60 67.2%  79.5%  
 
* Negative signs indicate that the variable in the corresponding row has a lower mean than the associated column    
variable. Values indicate the magnitude of the difference.   
**Total possible points equals 24 
  
Persuasion scores for the 1 percent method were found to be 
significantly lower than each of the other three. The null hypothesis of equality 
could not be rejected in the remaining comparisons. Overall scores are 
moderate, but the 100 year description, 26 percent chance method, and map 
can be said to be equa lly effective in this context. However, the 26 percent 
chance results should be eyed warily in light of the issues mentioned above.  
 
Comparing Overall Scores  
Comparisons of the descriptive methods’ overall scores were not found 
to be useful. Scales including all uncertainty and persuasion variables had 
Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.42 for the 100 year to 0.66 for the map. 
These scores indicate that an overall scale is not reliable and may point to a 
problem in linking understanding and persuasion. T-tests showed no 
significant differences between the methods of description. Those that had 
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relatively high scores in uncertainty had low scores in persuasion, and vice 
versa. This appears to be a fundamental problem in communicating flood  
risk.  Managers and policy makers may have to decide whether understanding 
or persuasion is most important.  
 
Comparing Attitudes Towards Individuals and Community 
 
 Another trend identified qualitatively during the interviews was the 
disparity between expressed attitudes towards personal loss and 
responsibility and community loss and responsibility. In order to address this 
issue quantitatively, all four descriptive scores for personal protection were 
combined. Scores were also combined for personal concern, community 
protec tion, and community concern variables. Cronbach scores were all over 
0.81, with a high of 0.94. Each new scale can be said to be reliable. 
Both community scores were somewhat skewed, but personal scores 
had a normal distribution. Comparisons were made using one-tailed t-tests at 
alpha = 0.05. The range of possible protection scores was from 4 to 16. 
Concern scores ranged from 4 to 24. Results are included in Tables 5.9 and 
5.10.  
 
Table 5.9. Comparison of Personal and Community Protection Variables  
Personal Protection 
95% Confidence Interval (Mean 
as a Percentage  
of Total Points)   
Dif. Sig. 
Mean 
(Total Points 
Equals 16) 
Low High 
Personal Protection NA NA 12.17 69.9% 82.2%  
Community Protection 1.74 .00 13.93 82.3% 91.8%  
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Table 5.10. Comparison of Personal and Community Concern 
Personal Concern  
95% Confidence Interval (Mean 
as a Percentage  
of Total Points)   
Dif. Sig. 
Mean 
(Total Points 
Equals 24) 
Low High 
Personal Concern NA NA 12.67 44.5% 61.0%  
Community Concern 5.62 .00 18.29 69.5% 82.9%  
 
 
 In both cases, community means were significantly higher than 
personal means. Part of the difference can be attributed to the responses of 
people with limited flood experience living in areas of minimal risk. But even 
those in areas considered at high risk for flooding tended to worry about their 
neighbors more than themselves. This might indicate another possible tack for 
emergency managers and planners. A focus on community impacts and 
benefits might create the concern and support necessary for non structural 
mitigation projects. However, it might also represent a transference of 
perceived responsibility the individual to the community, or, as was explained 
in Chapter One, a dissonant perception of personal risk. 
 The attitudes expressed may not translate into  community action or 
support for community protection projects. Survey results concerning activities 
during severe flooding showed that, while neighborhood activities were 
somewhat common in affected areas, city-wide participation was minimal (see 
Table 4.4). Likewise, though protection scores were relatively high, actions 
taken to protect personal property by those considered at risk (100 and 500 
year flood plain) were not widespread (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6). Only 11 out of 
the 26 individuals considered at risk claimed to have insurance. Only 5 of the 
15 in the 100 year floodplain have taken other mitigative measures. The 
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disparity between community and personal scores may also cause friction 
when community projects require what might be considered unnecessary 
personal adjustment.  
 
Comparing Specific and Abstract Descriptions 
 
In addition to rating their levels of personal and community concern in 
response to abstract descriptions of risk, participants were also asked to 
respond to specific descriptions. Flood levels were given relative to 
individuals’ residences and ranged from the “yard” to “over 1 foot” in the 
house (see Table 4.24).  Only personal concern was evaluated.  
During the interviews, participants appeared more involved and 
concern scores seemed  higher when discussing specifics. Personal concern 
scores for each of the abstract descriptions and for the lowest specific level 
given (yard) are included in Table 5.11. One-tailed paired t-tests were used to 
compare the means and detect significant differences. Results are found in 
Table 5.12. Because the abstract methods refer to a flood inundating the 
SFHA, only those living in the Special Flood Hazard Area were used in the 
comparison. 
 
Table 5.11. Specific and Abstract Levels of Concern* 
 Yard 100 Year 1% Chance 26% Chance Map 
Mean Personal 
Concern 4.53 3.87 2.67 3.60 3.80 
 
*Total possible points equals 6 
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Table 5.12. Comparisons of Personal Concern * 
100 Year 1% Chance 26% Chance Map 
 
Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. 
Yard .67 .10 1.87 .01 .93 .03 .73 .05 
 
*Total possible points equals 6 
 
 The mean level of concern was shown to be higher for the specific 
reference than for any of the other methods of flood description. Differences 
between the yard score and the 1 percent chance, the 26 percent chance, 
and the map were significant at alpha = 0.05. Only the difference between the 
100 year method and the yard was not. These results reinforce the potential 
usefulness of concrete reference points in communication. It might be that 
specific re ferences are more effective in motivating desired attitude and 
behavior than abstract descriptions of  flood risk. 
 
Testing Hypotheses of Perception 
 
 In addition to comparing the effectiveness of various methods of 
communicating flood risk, this project sought to examine the effects of some 
situational factors on perception. It was hypothesized that the understanding 
of uncertainty increased with education and flood experience. It was expected 
that perceived risk (illustrated through persuasion variables) would increase 
with age and would be higher for women than for men. Lastly, it was expected 
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that those living in the floodplain would have higher uncertainty and 
persuasion scores than those who do not. 
 The first three hypotheses were tested using Pearson’s product 
moment to detect positive correlations.  Education data were collected 
nominally, but were treated as a progressive 8 point scale in this test, 1 being 
the completion of 12th grade or lower without receiving a high school diploma 
or the equivalent, and 8 being the completion of a Ph.D. Experience was 
assessed through both frequency and impact. The frequency scale combined 
the number of times the individual’s current property has flooded with the 
number of times in their lifetime their property has flooded. This scale was 
found to be reliable and had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.69. Flooding of 
businesses and the community were not shown to be reliable measures. The 
damage scale was limited to positive responses concerning damage to 
structures, floor or wall coverings, appliances, furniture, or keepsakes, and 
contaminated drinking water. Cronbach’s alpha was 0.73 for this scale, 
showing it to be reliable as well. The original data on age was not altered.  
 Don’t Knows were treated as zeroes in correlation assessments in 
order to retain the number of cases and to make sure those who might 
answer Don’t Know most frequently were not left out. Including the Don’t 
Knows may assist in targeting education and improving communication. 
Correlation coefficients for these situational factors and uncertainty and 
persuasion scores are found in Table 5.13. Combined uncertainty, protection, 
concern, and persuasion scales were all found to be reliable. 
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Table 5.13. Correlations with Uncertainty and Persuasion Scores  
Uncertainty Protection Concern Persuasion 
 
Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
Education .32 .02 -.057 .36 -.24 .06 -.12 .22 
Experience 
(Frequency) -.04 .39 -.16 .15 -.14 .19 -.17 .13 
Experience 
(Damage) .16 .14 .03 .43 .14 .18 .10 .25 
Age -.17 .13 -.23 .07 -.14 .17 -.21 .08 
  
 
 Tests showed that only one of the hypothesized relationships existed in 
this sample. Education was shown to have a moderate positive correlation 
with the understanding of uncertainty concepts. However, a slight negative 
correlation between education and levels of concern was found to be just less 
than significant at alpha = 0.05. This may have to do with education’s relation 
to income and an increased ability to take action.  
 The final two hypotheses were tested using independent one-tailed t-
tests with an alpha of 0.05. Gender comparisons used “female” as the primary 
variable. Results are found in Table 5.14. Gender differences were significant 
in both levels of concern and overall persuasion scores (a combination of 
protection and concern). This result confirms the hypothesis that perceived  
risk is higher in women than men. Significant differences were also found 
between male and female uncertainty scores. Females in this sample had a 
lower understanding of uncertainty than did the males. This may be due to the 
difference in education levels between the men and women who participated 
in the survey. Independent t-tests found the women to have a mean education 
score 1.15 points lower than that of the men (p = 0.01). 
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Table 5.14. Gender Comparisons  
Uncertainty Protection Concern Persuasion 
 
Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. Dif. Sig. 
Difference Between 
Female and Male 
Means 
-4.40* .05 .99 .28 6.58 .01 8.07 .04 
 
*Negative sign indicates that female mean score is lower than male mean score  
 
 No significant differences were found in the attitudes of those living in 
the SFHA and those living in the 500 year floodplain. These categories were 
combined and then tested against the attitudes of non-floodplain dwellers. No 
significant differences were observed in either uncertainty or persuasion 
variables. This may, in part, be due to the rather common attitude of those 
living near the river that flooding is part of river life. As one man said, “It’s only 
water”. Is this an example of dis sonant perception, or an understanding and 
acceptance of the uncertainty of the chosen location? Many of those in the 
floodplain who have insurance feel they have done what they can to protect 
themselves and do not need to worry about personal loss. This might also 
partially explain the split between personal and community concern scores.  
  
Attitude and Behavior in the Floodplain  
 
 While the participation and support of the entire community are 
necessary to enact mitigation, one of the goals of flood policy is to encourage 
mitigative behavior in those living in the floodplain. In order to adjust methods 
of communication and look for areas of possible improvement in policy, it is 
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necessary to look at situational factors that might be correlated with desired 
action as well as attitude.  
 Twenty-six of the forty-five people interviewed lived in either the 100 
year or 500 year floodplain (see Table 4.6). Those in the 100 year are 
considered more at risk and policy targets their behavior more specifically 
than those living in the 500 year floodplain. I used cross tabulations to look at 
potential differences in the purchase of insurance and other pro -active 
behaviors (see Table 4.5) between the two populations. No significant 
differences were found in the likelihood of either group purchasing insurance.  
Those in the 500 year floodplain were shown to be significantly more likely (p 
= 0.04) to take other precautionary actions. However, it should be noted that 
many cited settling outside the 100 year flood plain as a  precautionary action. 
 Since there was no apparent difference in the purchasing of insurance 
between the two designated floodplains, broader associations were sought. 
Only 11 of the 26 claimed to have insurance. Pearson’s product moment was 
used to test the correlation between insurance and education, income, age, 
flood experience, and the number of years in Wimberley. It was expected to 
be positive in each case. Coefficients and significance for each variable are 
found in Table 5.15. No correlations were found between these situational 
factors and protective behaviors other than the purchase of insurance. Nor 
was any correlation apparent between experience (frequency or damage) and 
the purchase of insurance. All results in this section are based on a fairly 
small sample, however, and may not reflect relationships extant in the 
population.  
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Table 5.15. Situational Factors and Insurance Purchase  in the Floodplain 
 
Insurance Purchase  
 
Corr. Sig. 
Age .79 .00 
Income .54 .01 
Education .59 .00 
Years in Wimberley .43 .03 
 
 
 As predicted, all four situational factors were found to be positively 
correlated with floodplain residents’ purchase of insurance. All were significant 
at the 0.05 level. The correlation between age and insurance was particularly 
strong, perhaps pointing to the influences of life experiences not quantified in 
the variables used in this project. Age had additional positive correlations to 
education (0.57, p = .00) and income (0.37, p = .05). Education and income 
were also positively correlated (0.36, p = .06), though not significantly so at 
the .05 level. In the floodplain cases, the number of years spent in Wimberley 
was not associated with any other variable. However, when all cases were 
used, length of residence had a significant correlation to damage (.28, p = 
.03). In light of this, the number of years in Wimberley might be viewed as 
another measure of experience. The relationship of age, income, education, 
and insurance might point to the importance of a perceived ability to pay for 
insurance, while the years spent in Wimberley might instill in people a 
perceived need to pay in order to prevent loss.  
 What kind of relationships do expressed attitudes have with mitigative 
behavior in the floodplain? In order to explore this question, overall 
uncertainty, protection, and concern variables were set against the purchase 
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of insurance as well as other protective behavior. Pearson’s product moment 
was used to test the correlations. Results are included in Table 5.16. 
Significant correlations of situational factors followed the patterns of the full 
data set outlined in Table 5.13. 
 
Table 5.16. Floodplain Attitude and Behavior 
Purchase of Insurance Other Mitigative Behavior 
 
Corr. Sig. Corr.  Sig. 
Uncertainty .02 .47 .36 .03 
Concern -.41 .04 -.06 .39 
Protection .20 .19 -.40 .03 
 
 
 Three relationships were found to be significant. Two were negative 
and moderately strong. The hypothesized relationship between insurance and 
concern mentioned in the above section is borne out quantitatively here. 
Respondents already had or did not have insurance when asked about 
concern. Any explanation of correlation must reflect that temporal aspect. 
While tempting, it does not make sense to hypothesize that, because people 
are concerned, they have insurance. The quantitative correlation may be 
coincidental, but many in the floodplain said they were not concerned about 
loss because they had insurance. In fact, when compared using an 
independent t-test, the mean concern score of those with insurance was 8.4 
points lower than those without (p = .04). This relationship may prove to be a 
hurdle to those in the community attempting to implement additional mitigation 
measures. A similar phenomenon might also be at work in the negative 
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correlation between protection and behavior, though no significant difference 
was found when tested.  
 Uncertainty scores had a moderate (0.36) positive correlation to other 
mitigative behavior, though no correlation to insurance purchase. Uncertainty 
was also positively correlated to both  education and income. The behavioral 
correlation to uncertainty may indicate individuals with an understanding of 
risk, knowledge of protective measurements available (or required), and the 
means to implement them.  
 
Summary 
 
 Some of the hypotheses put forth in Chapter One regarding the relative 
effectiveness of the four descriptive methods were supported by statistical 
analysis. Others were discounted. As predicted, the 1 percent method was 
found to be significantly more effective in conveying uncertainty than any of 
the other three. It was also shown to be the least effective method in 
motivating attitudes of protection and concern. The map performed better than 
expected in terms of both understanding and persuasion and was significantly 
more effective than either of the probabilities at inducing desired levels of 
concern. The 100 year flood was also shown to be more effective than 
predicted in conveying uncertainty, though this may be due to the mental 
adjustment of an experienced community rather than a real understanding of 
the term. 
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 The 26 percent method was comparatively less effective than expected 
in conveying uncertainty. More importantly, qualitative and quantitative 
analysis pointed to underlying problems in using the 26 percent chance to 
describe flood risk. The extreme shift in attitude illustrated by the accuracy 
question and the 64 percent confusion rate described in Chapter Four indicate 
an inherent weakness in the method. These problems may be due, in part, to 
inappropriate coding. 
 Hypotheses regarding the relationships of situational and cognitive 
factors to perception were only partially supported by analysis. As expected, 
education and uncertainty scores were positively correlated. Women were 
found to have higher concern and persuasion scores than men. Predictions of 
positive correlations between age, experience, location and perception were 
not borne out in the results. These factors were found to be more closely 
related to behavior (see Table 5.13 for correlations to insurance purchase). 
 An important trend concerning the effectiveness of descriptive methods 
was identified through analysis. Uncertainty and persuasion appear to be 
irreconcilable in the current methods used to convey flood risk. This split is 
evident in the low Cronbach scores of the combined scales, the varied 
performance of the 1 percent chance method in different arenas, the lack of 
differentiation when overall scores were compared, and the opposite signs of 
correlations between education and uncertainty and education and concern. 
When tested directly, the negative correlation between uncertainty and certain 
persuasion variables is clear and significant. Results for the entire data set 
and for the floodplain subset are included in Table 5.17. This disparity is more 
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pronounced in the floodplain subset and may be one of the most difficult 
hurdles for policy makers and risk communicators to overcome.  
 
Table 5.17. Correlations Between Uncertainty and Persuasion 
Protection Concern Persuasion 
 
Corr.  Sig. Corr. Sig. Corr. Sig. 
Uncertainty (All) .11 .24 -.30 .02 -.14 .19 
Uncertainty (Floodplain) -.31 .06 -.43 .01 -.43 .02 
 
 
 The negative relationship between uncertainty and persuasion 
variables is only one of the trends identified through analysis. Chapter Five 
built on qualitative observation and the results presented in Chapter Four, 
statistically examining relationships between descriptive methods of flood risk, 
situational factors, perception, and behavior. General trends believed to have 
the greatest potential impact on effective communication are laid out in 
Chapter Six. 
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
Hypotheses 
  
 The project’s research hypotheses were addressed in Chapter Five. 
Only one of the hypotheses concerning the four methods of description was 
validated; the 1 percent chance method was found to be the most effective in 
conveying uncertainty and the least effective in motivating attitude. Both the 
map and the 100 year method produced better than expected uncertainty 
scores. The uncertainty score for the 26 percent method was worse than 
expected. 
 Five situational factors were predicted to have positive relationships 
with uncertainty and persuasion variables. Only two exhibited the expected 
correlations. Uncertainty scores increased with education levels and women 
were found to have higher concern and persuasion scores than men. Age, 
experience, and location were found to be related to the purchase of 
insurance, but had no significant correlation to uncertainty or persuasion 
variables. A more sensitive approach to location and a different evaluation of 
experience might alter these results, however. 
 Hypothesis testing provided a starting point for analysis, but the 
descriptive results presented in Chapter Four suggested other directions and 
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raised new questions.  By examining  these possibilities, unexpected patterns 
in the data were revealed, producing more meaningful results. These new 
directions provided a broader perspective and a deeper understanding of the 
data, allowing it to be applied in a wider arena. 
 
Implications for Flood Risk Communication 
 
 Four potentially important trends concerning the effective 
communication of flood risk and flood policy were identified using quantitative 
and qualitative analysis.  
 
§ First, effectiveness judged through understanding and effectiveness 
judged by persuasion appear to be at odds using current methods of 
description. Unless communication changes, a choice may have to be 
made. Persuasion and the ‘engineering model’ will likely prevail. The 
results of this project contradict the claim of the NRC (1995, 2000) that 
persuasion is dependent upon an understanding of uncertainty. More 
contextual research is necessary to clarify the relationship. 
 
§ Second, the description of a flood with a 26 percent chance of 
occurring in 30 years induced confusion, vehemence, and dismissal in 
the sample group. Further use of this term should be reconsidered in 
light of this reaction. 
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§ Third, a significant difference was found in effectiveness as persuasion 
when related to individuals and the community. While this expressed 
difference might be capitalized on, it is more likely to be a hurdle to 
community mitigation projects.  
 
§ Lastly, survey participants were more concerned about flood levels 
than flood frequency and were more effectively persuaded when 
concrete references were used. These results reinforce 
recommendations by the NRC (1995, 2000) and Smith (2000) to 
include damage estimates and may point the way towards more 
effective communication. 
 
Just as this project built on previous research regarding flood risk 
communication, the identification of these four trends may provide a base 
upon which other research can continue to build. The split between 
understanding and persuasion appears to be of particular concern, though it 
may be the result of a one size fits all flood policy and subsequent evaluation. 
Regardless, the relationship between the two must be better understood if 
flood plain management of any scale is to be effective.  
 
Implications for Wimberley 
 
 Flood management in Wimberley appears to have focused on 
emergency response rather than pre-event planning or education. These 
aspects of preparation will become more important as the populations of both 
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the village and the valley grow. The collective memory may fade with 
proportional experience. Newcomers might not have access to the mental and 
physical adjustments employed by the community in the past. A common 
context must be created.  
 One of the biggest potential difficulties facing floodplain managers 
focusing on pre-event context will be the apparent distrust of Wimberley 
residents. This hurdle may be as specific to Wimberley as the 2002 
referendum proposing a dissolution of the village government. However, 
Anderson’s (2000) work indicates the problem may be more widespread. 
Without trust, risk communication will not be effective.  
 In developing the Comprehensive Plan of 2002, the local government 
mailed surveys to every voter in greater Wimberley. Hays County used an 
internet survey in order to incorporate public input into the Hays County 
Mitigation Plan (www.co.hays.tx.us). These surveys set a precedent of broad, 
multidimensional communication that could potentially build trust. If good, 
consistent information is made available, this method could also be used to 
build locally effective flood policy. In the meantime, the burden of risk 
communication will likely fall to the media and local organizations. Managers 
may want to target these public contacts. 
 
Generalization and Future Directions 
 
 The results of this project reinforced previous findings. Situational 
factors like education and gender were found to be related to perception (see 
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Tables 5.11 and 5.12); other situational factors were indirectly related through 
behavior (see Table 5.13). The effects of experience might be seen in the 
fairly consistent (and high) uncertainty scores (see Table 5.4). Response 
patterns clearly showed the importance of both the media and trust in risk 
communication. Results also supported those advocating attaching concrete 
references to abstract methods of communication.  
 Previous research concerning the relationship of understanding and 
persuasion was not supported, however. Nor were those touting the 26 
percent chance description as an effective method of communicating flood 
risk. The sample was small, though, and Wimberley, like all places, is unique. 
No sweeping generalizations should be made based on this (or any) study. It 
is a supporting player. 
 While generalization is difficult, future research in communities large 
and small, experienced and non-experienced, may help identify components 
relevant to effective communication and contextually effective codes. The use 
of multivariate analysis adjusted for contextual relationships might assist in 
this search. Further research assessing the effectiveness of flood risk 
communication could result in new, democratic methods of description and 
help close the gap between understanding and persuasion. If effectiveness is 
valued over efficiency, loss and s uffering due to flooding might be reduced.  
 The role of flood policy itself cannot be ignored, however. In this 
project, and in general assessments of effectiveness, all individuals and 
communities were judged against a single perceptual and behavioral 
standard. The questions Murphy (1958) and White (Interview with Reuss, 
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1991) raised, and that Smith (2000) and others continue to raise regarding the 
effectiveness of a uniform flood policy, are still relevant. In order to truly 
assess the effectiveness of flood risk communication, it might also be 
necessary to look at the contextual effectiveness of ‘efficient’ flood policy. 
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Appendix A: Questionnaire  
 
 
Efficient and Effective? 
The Hundred Year Flood in the Communication and Perception of Flood 
Risk 
 
 
Conducted by Heather Bell 
University of South Florida 
 
 
 
Faculty Advisor: 
Dr. Graham Tobin 
 
 
 
Introductory Statement 
 
Hello, my name is Heather Bell. I’m a graduate student at the University of 
South Florida and I’m conducting a survey on people’s attitudes toward 
flooding. I’d like to ask you some questions about your experience with 
flooding and how you feel about the likelihood of future floods. All of your 
answers are completely confidential; they will only be used for statistical 
purposes. The study is not funded by any company or corporation, and I am 
NOT trying to sell you anything. You may stop the interview at any time, but 
your participation will not only help me finish my thesis, it might also influence 
the way people talk about flooding and flood policy. The survey takes about 
25 minutes to complete. Do you have any questions? May I continue? 
 
If you have any questions or would like more information, please contact Dr. 
Graham Tobin at the University of South Florida at 813-974-4808. He can 
also be reached through e -mail at gtobin@cas.usf.edu. 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
 
SURVEY NUMBER:                                                            FZONE: 
 
FIRST I’D LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT 
YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH FLOODING. 
  
Personal Flood History  
 
1. Have you ever been flooded?  
 
 
If no, skip to question 4. 
 
2. How many times has your current home been flooded? 
   
 
 
 
3. In your lifetime, how many times has your home or property been 
flooded? 
 
 
 
 
4. In your lifetime, has your workplace been flooded? If no, mark 0. How 
many times? 
 
 
 
 
5. In your lifetime, how many times has a community you have lived in 
experienced flooding?  
 
 
 
If all above answers are 0, skip to question 12. 
 
 
 
NOW I’D LIKE TO ASK YOU SOME MORE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS 
ABOUT DAMAGES AND WHAT YOU DID DURING FLOODING.  
 
 
Give interviewee damages card 
 
 
YES (1) 
NO (0) 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
 
ON THIS CARD IS A LIST OF POSSIBLE DAMAGES DUE TO 
FLOODING.  
 
 
6. What kinds of damages have you personally experienced? 
 
YES (1) Structural Damage to Residence 
 NO (0) 
1 Damage to Floor or Wall Coverings  
 0 
1 Damage to Furniture 
 0 
1 Damage to Appliances  
 0 
1 Damage to Keepsakes  
 0 
1 Contaminated Drinking Water 
 0 
1 Damage to Crops  
 0 
1 Disrupted Transportation 
 0 
1 Loss of Business 
 0 
1 Injury 
 0 
1 Death of Family Member or Friend 
 0 
1 Other (Please Describe) 
0 
 
 
7. During a flood, have you ever taken any of the following measures? 
 
YES (1) Moved Valuables to Higher Elevation 
 NO (0) 
1 Sandbagged Doorways or Entrances  
 0 
1 Evacuated Your Property 
 0 
1 Other (Please Describe) 
 0 
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WE’VE TALKED ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCE WITH FLOODING IN 
GENERAL. NOW I’D LIKE TO TALK TO YOU ABOUT A SPECIFIC EVENT. 
 
8. Did you live in Wimberley during the 1998 October flood?  
 
 
 
 
If no, skip to question 12. 
 
9. During the 1998 flood, were you a part of the Emergency Response 
Team?  
 
YES (1) 
NO (0) 
 
 
Give interviewee activity card 
 
10. Please indicate which, if any, of the activities listed on the card you 
took part in during the 1998 flood. 
 
YES (1) Sandbagging 
NO (0) 
1 Search and Rescue 
 0 
1 Distributing Food and Water 
0 
1 Distributing Aid 
 0 
1 Donating 
 0 
1 Community Clean-Up 
0 
1 Other (Please Describe) 
 0 
 
 
11. To the best of your knowledge, what size was the 1998 flood? 
 
 
DK (555) 
 
 
YES (1) 
NO (0) 
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Begin questions here after skips. 
 
I’D NOW LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT ANY MEASURES YOU’VE TAKEN 
AGAINST FLOODING IN GENERAL. I’D ALSO LIKE TO ASK ABOUT 
YOUR FAMILIARITY WITH FLOOD INFORMATION AND PROGRAMS. 
 
 
12. In your lifetime, what measures have you personally taken against 
flooding?  
 
YES (1) Raised House Above Flood 
Level NO (0) 
1 Raised Utilities Above Flood 
Level 0 
1 Other (Please describe) 
 0 
 
 
 
13. Do you have flood insurance? 
 
YES (1) 
NO (0) 
 
 
 
14. Do you currently live in a Special Flood Hazard Area? 
 
YES (1) 
NO (0) 
DK (555) 
 
 
 
15. How familiar are you with the National Flood Insurance Program? 
 
Very Unfamiliar (1) 
Somewhat Unfamiliar (2) 
Somewhat Familiar (3) 
Very Familiar (4) 
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Appendix A (Continued) 
 
HERE’S A CARD LISTING SOME POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FLOOD 
INFORMATION. PLEASE USE IT TO ANSWER THE NEXT TWO 
QUESTIONS. 
 
 
16.  What is your primary source for information about local flooding 
characteristics? 
 
YES (1) TV or Radio 
NO (0) 
1 Newspapers  
0 
1 Friends or Family  
0 
1 Local Gov’t 
0 
1 State or National 
Gov’t 0 
1 Other (Please 
Describe) 
 
0 
 
                     
 
17. What is your primary source for information about flood response 
options? 
 
YES (1) TV or Radio 
NO (0) 
1 Newspapers  
0 
1 Friends or Family  
0 
1 Local Gov’t 
0 
1 State or National 
Gov’t 0 
1 Other (Please 
Describe) 
 
0 
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Give interviewee card with satisfaction scale. 
 
 
 
18. Using this scale, how would you rate your overall satisfaction with 
available flood information? 
 
Very Dissatisfied (1) 
Somewhat Dissatisfied (2) 
Neither Satisfied nor Unsatisfied (3) 
Somewhat Satisfied (4) 
Very Satisfied (5) 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU. THE NEXT THREE SETS OF QUESTIONS HAVE TO DO 
WITH FLOODS DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY OR 
PROBABILITY. HERE ARE TWO CARDS WITH THE SCALES YOU’LL 
USE TO ANSWER THEM. THE FIRST DEALS WITH AGREEMENT. THE 
SECOND DEALS WITH CONCERN. 
 
 
 
 
 
Give interviewee agreement and concern cards. 
 
 
 
 
 
The One Hundred Year Flood 
 
19. The size of a flood is often described in terms of a time period. For 
example, we can describe a flood as being a 50 year flood, 100 year 
flood, or a 500 year flood. The following questions have to do with a 
100 year flood, like the flood of 1998.  Please indicate your level of 
agreement with the following statements using the categories listed on 
the agreement card.  
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A flood of the same 
size as the 100 yr flood 
could happen one or 
more times in any yr 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Agree 
 
(3) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(4) 
Don’t 
Know 
(555) 
A flood of the same 
size as the 100 yr flood 
will not happen again 
in my lifetime 
1 2 3 4 555 
Scientists can 
accurately assess the 
size of a 100 year flood 
1 2 3 4 555 
The size of the 100 
year flood will change 
over time 
1 2 3 4 555 
I should protect myself 
against the 100 year 
flood 
1 2 3 4 555 
My community should 
protect itself against 
the 100 year flood 
1 2 3 4 555 
 
 
 
THE NEXT QUESTION DEALS WITH YOUR CONCERN ABOUT 
LOSSES DUE TO FLOODING 
 
 
20.  Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the 
following using the categories listed on the concern card. 
 
Personal 
loss due to 
a 100 year 
flood 
Very 
Unconc 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconc  
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconc  
(3) 
 
Slightly 
Conc 
(4) 
Somewhat 
Conc. 
(5) 
Very 
Conc  
(6) 
Community 
loss due to 
a100 year 
flood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS IS SIMILAR TO THE LAST. THE SIZE 
OF A FLOOD CAN ALSO BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS OF ITS 
PROBABILITY. THIS SET OF QUESTIONS CONCERNS A FLOOD 
WITH A 1% CHANCE OF OCCURRING IN ANY YEAR. YOU WILL USE 
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A Flood with a 1% Chance of Occurring in Any Year 
 
21. Please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the following 
statements. 
  
A 1% chance flood could 
happen one or more 
times in any year 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Agree 
 
(3) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(4) 
Don’t 
Know 
(555) 
If our community 
experiences a  1% 
chance flood this year, 
we will be safe from one 
next year 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
Scientists can accurately 
assess the size of a flood 
with a 1% chance of 
occurring in any year 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
The size of a 1% chance 
flood will change over 
time 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
I should protect myself 
against a flood with a 1% 
chance of occurring in 
any year 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
My community should 
protect itself from a 1% 
chance flood 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
 
 
THE NEXT QUESTION AGAIN DEALS WITH CONCERN ABOUT LOSSES 
 
22. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the 
following. 
 
Personal 
loss due to a 
1% chance 
flood  
Very 
Unconc 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconc 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconc  
(3) 
 
Slightly 
Conc  
(4) 
Somewhat 
Conc. 
(5) 
Very 
Conc  
(6) 
Community 
loss due to a 
1% chance 
flood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS WILL USE THE SAME SCALES.  THE 
QUESTIONS ARE SIMIL AR TO THOSE IN THE LAST SECTIONS. THIS 
TIME THE STATEMENTS DEAL WITH A FLOOD THAT HAS A 26% 
CHANCE OF OCCURRING IN A 30 YEAR PERIOD 
 
 
A Flood with a 26% Chance of Occurring in 30 Years  
  
 
23. Please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the following 
statements. 
 
A flood with a 26% 
chance of occurring in 
30 years could happen 
one or more times in 
any year 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Agree 
 
(3) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(4) 
Don’t 
Know 
(555) 
If a 26% chance flood 
happens this year, we 
will be safe from one 
next year 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
Scientists can 
accurately assess the 
size of a 26% chance 
flood 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
The size of a flood with 
a 26% chance of 
occurring in 30 years 
will change over time 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
I should protect myself 
against a flood with a 
26% chance of 
occurring in 30 years 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
My community should 
protect itself against a 
26% chance flood 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
 
 
 
 
LIKE THE LAST TWO SECTIONS, THIS SECTION ALSO INCLUDES 
QUESTIONS ON LOSSES AND LEVELS OF CONCERN. 
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24. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the 
following. 
 
Personal loss 
due to a flood 
with a 26% 
chance of 
occurring in 30 
years 
Very 
Unconc  
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconc  
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconc  
(3) 
 
Slightly 
Conc  
(4) 
Somewhat 
Conc  
(5) 
Very 
Conc 
(6) 
Community loss 
due to a 26% 
chance flood 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
NEXT WE’RE GOING TO USE A MAP. 
 
Give interviewee flood map  
 
THIS IS A FLOOD HAZARD MAP. I’LL GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO 
LOOK AT IT AND THEN ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT IT  
 
25. The darkly shaded area represents the extent of a flood that flood 
policy considers hazardous. Using the categories on the agreement 
card, please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the 
following statements. 
 
The outlined flood 
could happen one or 
more times in any  
year 
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Agree 
 
(3) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(4) 
Don’t 
Know 
(555) 
If a flood of the size 
outlined happens this 
year, it will not happen 
next year. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
If I live here (show 
point outside all 
shading), I am safe 
from flooding. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
I should protect 
myself against the 
flood outlined on the 
map 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
My community should 
protect itself against  
the flood outlined on 
the map. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
555 
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THE NEXT QUESTION AGAIN CONCERNS LOSSES 
 
26. Please indicate the level to which you are concerned about each of the 
following. 
 
Personal 
loss due to 
the flood 
outlined on 
the map 
Very 
Unconc 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconc 
(2) 
Slightly 
Unconc  
(3) 
 
Slightly 
Conc  
(4) 
Somewhat 
Conc 
(5) 
Very 
Conc  
(6) 
Community 
loss due to 
the flood 
outlined on 
the map 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
WE’VE TALKED ABOUT FLOODS IN TERMS OF FREQUENCY AND 
PROBABILITY. IN THE NEXT SET OF QUESTIONS, WE WILL FOCUS 
ON FLOOD LEVELS. WE WILL AGAIN USE THE SCALE OF 
CONCERN.  
 
 
Flood Levels 
 
 
27. I’m going to read off a list of flood levels relative to your residence. 
Please indicate the level of personal concern you would associate with 
each level. 
 
Yard  or 
Outside 
Walls  
Very 
Unconc 
(1) 
Somewhat 
Unconc  
(2) 
 
Slightly 
Unconc 
(3) 
 
Slightly 
Conc  
(4) 
 
Somewhat  
Conc 
(5) 
Very 
Conc 
(6) 
1 to 6 
inches  
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 
6 inches to 
1 foot 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 
1 foot to 3 
feet 
1 
 
2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
Appendix A (Continued) 
 
THE NEXT QUESTION DEALS WITH YOUR GENERAL CONCERNS 
ABOUT FLOODING. 
 
 
28. What concerns you the most about flooding? 
 
YES (1) The Level of 
Possible 
Flooding NO (0) 
1 The Frequency 
of Flooding of 
Any Level 0 
1 A Combination of 
Level and 
Frequency 0 
 
 
 
WE’RE ALMOST DONE. THE LAST QUESTIONS ARE SIMPLY 
USED TO GATHER SOME INFORMATION ABOUT THE GROUP OF 
PEOPLE BEING INTERVIEWED.  AGAIN, ALL THE INFORMATION 
IS CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
Personal Information 
 
 
 
29. Gender 
 
YES (1) Female 
 NO (0) 
1 Male 
 0 
 
 
 
 
 
Give interviewee race card 
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30. Which of those listed on this card best describes your race or 
ethnicity?  
 
YES (1) African American 
NO (0) 
1 Asian  
 0 
1 Latino 
0 
1 Native American 
0 
1 White, non 
Latino 0 
1 Other Race 
(Please 
Describe) 
0 
 
 
 
 
31. How long have you lived at your current address as of August 1st, 
2004? 
 
 
 
 
 
32. How long have you lived in Wimberley  as of August 1 st, 2004?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Give interviewee schooling card  
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33. Which of the educational levels listed on this card best describes the 
highest level of school or highest degree you have completed?  
 
YES (1) 12th grade or 
less NO (0) 
1 High School 
graduate or 
equivalent 0 
1 Some college 
0 
1 Associate 
degree 
(academic or 
occupational) 
0 
1 Bachelor’s 
degree 0 
1 Master’s degree 
0 
1 Professional 
school  
degree 
0 
1 Doctorate  
0 
 
 
 
Give interviewee income card 
 
 
34. Using this card, please indicate which category best describes your 
household income in 2003? 
 
YES (1) Under $20,000 
 NO (0) 
1 $20,001 – 35,000 
 0 
1 $35,001 – 50,000 
 0 
1 $50,001 – 75,000 
 0 
1 $75,001 – 100,000 
 0 
1 Over $100,000 
 0 
 
159 
Appendix A (Continued) 
 
 
35. Lastly, what is your age as of your most recent birthday?  
 
 
 
 
 
THAT COMPLETES THE SURVEY. THANK YOU SO MUCH FOR 
PARTICIPATING.           
 
 
 
Don’t forget the survey cards. 
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Flood Hazard Map 
 
Map Centerpoint: -98.09538, 29.99150 
Map Produced: Sat Oct 23 16:47:09 2004  
 
ESRI/FEMA Project Impact 
Hazard Information and Awareness Site  
http://www.esri.com/hazards 
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Flood Hazard Map 
 
Map Centerpoint: -98.07894, 29.99231 
Map Produced: Sat Oct 23 17:01:38 2004  
 
 
ESRI/FEMA Project Impact 
Hazard Information and Awareness Site  
http://www.esri.com/hazards 
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Flood Hazard Map 
 
Map Centerpoint: -98.12596, 29.97809 
Map Produced: Sat Oct 23 17:08:01 2004  
 
ESRI/FEMA Project Impact 
Hazard Information and Awareness Site  
http://www.esri.com/hazards  
 
